

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THE RETENTION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

SPEECH

OF

HON. HENRY CABOT LODGE,

OF MASSACHUSETTS,

IN THE

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

MARCH 7, 1900.

WASHINGTON.
1900.
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SPEECH

OF

HON. HENRY CABOT LODGE.

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

The Secretary read the bill (S. 2355) in relation to the suppression of insurrection and to the government of the Philippine Islands, ceded by Spain to the United States by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 10th day of December, 1898, reported from the Committee on the Philippines, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That when all insurrection against the sovereignty and authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, acquired from Spain by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 10th day of December, 1898, shall have been completely suppressed by the military and naval forces of the United States, all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the said islands shall, until otherwise provided by Congress, be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion.

Mr. LODGE. This bill, Mr. President, is simple but all sufficient. It makes no declarations and offers no promises as to a future we can not yet predict. It meets the need of the present and stops there. The President, under the military power, which still controls and must for some time control the islands, could do all that this bill provides. But it is well that he should have the direct authorization of Congress and be enabled to meet any emergency that may arise with the sanction of the law-making power, until that power shall decree otherwise. Above all it is important that Congress should assert its authority; that we should not leave the Executive acting with the unlimited authority of the war power to go on alone after the conclusion of peace, but that he should proceed under the authority of Congress in whatever he does until Congress shall otherwise and more specifically provide. By this bill we follow the well-settled American precedents of Jefferson and Monroe, which were used still later in the case of Hawaii. To leave the war power unrestrained after the end of war, as was done in the case of California and New Mexico, is to abdicate our own authority. This bill is the assertion of Congressional authority and of the legislative power of the Government. To undertake any further or more far-reaching legislation at this time would be, in my judgment, a great mistake. But I believe it to be of great importance to define our position, so that it may be perfectly understood by the inhabitants of the Philippines, as well as by our own people.

Negotiations, concessions, promises, and hesitations are to the Asiatic mind merely proofs of weakness, and tend only to encourage useless outbreaks, crimes, and disorders. A firm attitude, at once just and fearless, impresses such people with a sense of strength and will calm them, give them a feeling of security,

and tend strongly to bring about peace and good order. This bill conveys this impression, states the present position of the United States, and does nothing more. The operative and essential part of it is in the very words of the act by which Congress authorized Jefferson to govern Louisiana, and which received his approbation and signature. It was also used by Congress and by President Monroe in 1819 in regard to Florida. I think that in such a case we may safely tread in the footsteps of the author of the Declaration of Independence. He saw no contradiction between that great instrument and the treaty with Napoleon, or the act to govern Louisiana. Some modern commentators take a different view and are unable to reconcile the acquisition of territory without what they call the consent of the governed with the principles of the Declaration. Jefferson found no such difficulty, and I can not but think that he understood the meaning of the Declaration as well as its latest champions and defenders. At all events, I am content to follow him, content to vote for his bill, content to accept his interpretation of what he himself wrote. Even if he is wrong those of us who agree with him can console ourselves by thinking that it is perhaps "better to err with Pope than shine with Pye."

The questions involved in the future management of these islands and in our policy in the far East are of a nature to demand the highest and the most sagacious statesmanship. I have always thought with Webster that party politics should cease "at the water's edge." He spoke only in reference to our relations with foreign nations, but I think we might well apply his patriotic principle to our dealings with our own insular possessions, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific. The Philippines should be an American question, not the sport of parties or the subject of party creeds. The responsibility for them rests upon the American people, not upon the Democratic or Republican party. If we fail in dealing with them we shall all alike suffer from the failure, and if we succeed the honor and the profit will redound in the end to the glory and the benefit of all. This view no doubt seems visionary. It certainly ought not to be so, and in time I believe it will be accepted. Unfortunately it is not the case to-day.

One of the great political parties of the country has seen fit to make what is called "an issue" of the Philippines. They have no alternative policy to propose which does not fall to pieces as soon as it is stated. A large and important part of their membership, North and South, is heartily in favor of expansion, because they are Americans, and have not only patriotism but an intelligent perception of their own interests. They are the traditional party of expansion, the party which first went beyond seas and tried to annex Hawaii, which plotted for years to annex Cuba, which have in our past acquisitions of territory their one great and enduring monument. In their new wanderings they have developed a highly commendable, if somewhat hysterical, tenderness for the rights of men with dark skins dwelling in the islands of the Pacific, in pleasing contrast to the harsh indifference which they have always manifested toward those American citizens who "wear the shadowed livery of the burnished sun" within the boundaries of the United States. The Democratic party has for years been the advocate of free trade and increased exports, but now they shudder at our gaining control of the Pacific and developing our commerce with the East. Ready in their opposition to protection, to open our mar-

kets to the free competition of all the tropical, all the cheapest, labor of the world, they are now filled with horror at the thought of admitting to our markets that small fragment of the world's cheap labor contained in the Philippine Islands, something which neither Republicans nor anyone else think for one moment of doing. Heedless of their past and of their best traditions, careless of their inconsistencies, utterly regardless of the obvious commercial interests of the South, which they control; totally indifferent to the wishes and beliefs of a large portion of their membership, and to the advice and example of some of their most patriotic, most loyal, and most courageous leaders, to whom all honor is due, the managers of the Democratic organization have decided to oppose the retention of the Philippines and our policy of trade expansion in the East, for which those islands supply the corner stone. Their reason appears to be the highly sagacious one that it is always wise to oppose whatever Republicans advocate, without regard to the merits of the policy or to the circumstances which gave it birth. I will make no comment upon this theory of political action, except to say that it has seemed for a long time exceedingly congenial to the intelligence of the Democratic party, and that it may perhaps account for the fact that since 1860 they have only held for eight years a brief and ineffective power. As an American I regret that our opponents should insist on making a party question of this new and far-reaching problem, so fraught with great promise of good both to ourselves and to others. As a party man and as a Republican I can only rejoice. Once more our opponents insist that we shall be the only political party devoted to American policies. As the standard of expansion once so strongly held by their great predecessors drops from their nerveless hands we take it up and invite the American people to march with it. We offer our policy to the American people, to Democrats and to Republicans, as an American policy, alike in duty and honor, in morals and in interest, as one not of skepticism and doubt, but of hope and faith in ourselves and in the future, as becomes a great young nation which has not yet learned to use the art of retreat or to speak with the accents of despair. In 1804 the party which opposed expansion went down in utter wreck before the man who, interpreting aright the instincts, the hopes, and the spirit of the American people, made the Louisiana purchase. We make the same appeal in behalf of our American policies. We have made the appeal before, and won, as we deserved to win. We shall not fail now.

Before explaining our policy I should be glad, as a preliminary, to state the policy proposed by our opponents, so that I could contrast our own with it, but I have thus far been unable to discover what their policy is. No doubt it exists, no doubt it is beautiful, but, like many beautiful things, it seems to the average searcher after truth both diaphanous and elusive. We have had presented to us, it is true, the policy desired by Aguinaldo and his followers, that we should acknowledge him as a government, enforce his rule upon the other eighty-three tribes and upon all the other islands, and then protect him from foreign interference. This plan, which would involve us in endless wars with the natives and keep us embroiled with other nations, loads us with responsibility without power and falls into ruin and absurdity the moment it is stated. Another proposition is that we should treat the Philippines as we

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But it is not necessary to stretch Jefferson's phrase embodying a general principle in which we all believe on the Procrustean bed of facts. As the Frenchman said, "No generalization is completely true, not even this one." To pull a sentence out of a revolutionary manifesto and deal with it as if it was one of the labored and chiseled clauses of the Constitution shows a sad confusion of thought. Neither Thomas Jefferson nor any other sensible man supposed for one moment that it was possible to have a government rest on the expressed consent of all the governed. No such government has ever existed, or ever can exist, and yet the Governments of the United States and of the several States of the Union rest to-day firmly and absolutely upon the consent of the governed. Take my own State of Massachusetts. The total population of the State is, in round numbers, 2,500,000. The total number of registered voters for the State election of 1899 was 490,483. The other 2,000,000 inhabitants of Massachusetts, men, women, and children, had neither the right nor the power in any way to express their consent to the government of the State. The people who had the right to rule this State were a little less than one-fifth of the population, and of those people 297,000 only exercised the privilege last November. Of the two million and a half people resident in Massachusetts, less than three hundred thousand have expressed their consent to the government which to-day rules over them Yet the government of Massachusetts rests on the consent of the governed, if any government of the world ever did. and we know it not from the number of voters who vote, but from the fact that the entire population acquiesce in the form of government under which a majority of a small minority of the people rule the State. In other words. the consent of the governed is not to be determined by votes alone, nor their dissent by the riot, insurrection, or disorder of a fraction of the population. The plebiscites which supported the third Napoleon on his throne did not represent the consent of the people of France, and yet they were large and near y unanimous. While, on the other hand, the closely divided vote of our last general election supplies in its result, which all men accept, the firm foundation upon which the Government of the United States to-day rests with the consent of all the governed. From this it follows that the consent of the governed is a phrase which represents a great and just principle, but which in practice must have its existence determined by actual facts and conditions, and is not to be ascertained merely by voting or in any other one way.

But this is not all. We must go a step farther and see how the American people throughout their history have applied this principle to the vast territory which they have acquired. We have an immediate interpretation of the declaration in the secret treaty made with France at the time of the treaty of alliance in 1778. In that treaty occurs the following article:

> If the United States should think fit to attempt the reduction of British power remaining in the northern parts of America. or the Islands of Bermudas, those countries or islands, in case of success, shall be confederated with or dependent upon the said United States.

It will be observed that this clause provides for the acquisition of inhabited territory by conquest, and asserts the right of the United States to govern the territory so conquered as a dependency of the United States. if it sees fit. I find nothing in it about the consent of the governed, yet that treaty clause was drawn by

Benjamin Franklin, who was on the committee which drafted the Declaration of Independence, and to whom it was submitted for amendment and correction. I can not but feel that Franklin knew what the Declaration meant, and that he saw no inconsistency with it in writing the clause of the treaty which I have quoted and which the circumstances of the time demanded.

Hard upon this first practical interpretation of the Declaration of Independence came our first extension of territory through the conquest of the Illinois country by George Rogers Clark. That brilliant feat of arms carried our boundaries to the Mississippi on the west and to the Great Lakes on the north. But I never heard that we asked the consent of the French inhabitants of that region, which had been wrested from France by England, to our government, when by the right of conquest they were ceded to us under the treaty of Paris.

The next, and the greatest of all our expansions, was the Louisiana purchase. There is no word in the treaty about the consent of the governed, nor in the resolutions of Congress which gave Jefferson the power to rule over that vast region, nor in the act organizing the territorial government, which was to be the creation of the Executive power. Yet there were 30,000 white men settled at the mouth of the Mississippi and in its neighborhood who had no good will to this Government, and whose wishes were never consulted at all by the nations which decided their fate. Are we to be told that this differs from the case of the Filipinos because the inhabitants of Louisiana were few and the territory was vast and sparsely populated? I have heard such an argument advanced, incredible as it may seem, and I can only reply to it by asking if the consent of the governed rests upon the number of the people involved? If so, at what point in the census does this great doctrine begin to take effect? I confess, Mr. President, that my principles in regard to the rights of man are not quite so flexible as that. The doctrine of the consent of the governed is just as sacred for one man as for ten, for thirty thousand as for ten million. To say that it is modified or determined by land areas or census statistics is as apposite as to declare that it is controlled by the abundance of springs or the paucity of trees. Such a proposition is fit to go hand in hand with that other which I find in resolutions and speeches here, to the effect that it is permissible to rule without the consent of the governed if you will promise to do it only for a little while. No, Mr. President, if the consent of the governed is a rigid and immutable principle, no casuistry of this sort can make it at once absolute and open to modification. It is either subject to the laws of common sense in its application or it is fixed and unchangeable. It can not be both at once. Jefferson's mind was certainly free from all such confusions. He did not attempt to rest his acquisition and government of Louisiana without the consent of the governed on any such grounds as the numbers of the population or the size of the territory. He put it on the real ground, that of truth and common sense, for in 1803 he wrote to De Witt Clinton:

> Although it is acknowledged that our new fellow-citizens are as yet incapable of self-government as children, yet some can not bring themselves to suspend its principles for a single moment.[1]

[1] Extract of a letter from Thomas Jefferson to De Witt Clinton, dated at Washington, December 2, 1803. Page 283 of The writings of Thomas Jefferson, edited by Paul Leicester Ford.

Thus, then, under the guidance of Thomas Jefferson, and with a Congress obedient to his slightest behest, we took Louisiana without the consent of the governed, and ruled it without their consent so long as we saw fit. Who is there to day who will stand up and say that Thomas Jefferson did not do well and rightly when he bought Louisiana?

A few years more passed, and, in 1819, we bought Florida from Spain without the consent of the governed, and this crime against the Declaration of Independence was perpetrated by John Quincy Adams and James Monroe. Moreover, Congress placed in the hands of President Monroe, the principal criminal, power to govern this new territory absolutely, in the very terms employed by a previous Congress when they conferred a like authority upon Thomas Jefferson.

The next case is Texas. There we had technically the consent of the governed, but it so happened that those who ruled Texas were Americans. They had gone into that region, settled the country, and conquered it in war from Mexico. Having done that, they decided to rejoin their own country, bringing their conquered territory with them. The way was a little more round-about, but the result was the same as if the Government of the United States had conquered Texas for itself. I never have been able to discover any indication that the Mexicans who lived in that great region had their consent asked, and I have a very strong impression that the rule of the American invaders was forced upon such persons as happened to be there before their arrival, without regard to the latter's wishes.

Then came the Mexican war, and by the treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo we received a great cession of territory from Mexico, including all the California coast; and although we paid Mexico twenty millions as indemnity I think it has been held that the cession was one of conquest. There were many Mexicans living within the ceded territory. We never asked their consent. Must we again draw the census line and say that the country was too large and they were too few to be entitled to a consent? There seems to be no other escape, if it is desired to distinguish the California acquisition from that of the Philippines. I need not dwell upon the Gadsden purchase which followed in 1852, except to say that under its provisions we bought territory with the people on it from Mexico, and nobody was consulted except the Governments of Mexico and of the United States.

The consent of the governed appears next in a question which involved, not the expansion of the United States, but the retention of a large part of its existing domain. In 1861 eleven states of the Union decided to leave it. With the profoundest faith in the justice of their cause, with the utmost bravery and the highest military skill, they fought their battle for four long years. What was the reply of the people of the United States to the proposition of the eleven seceding States? Simply this, "You shall not go," and the people of the United States, with the profoundest faith in the justice of their cause, and with bravery and skill quite equal to that of their Southern brethren, fought for their belief for four years, and won. We forced the Southern States back into the Union, and will any one tell me that we asked the consent of the governed? I have heard it said that this was a case to which the consent of the governed could not apply, because it was rebellion against the will of the majority, which we had all agreed to obey. Even this poor quibble will not serve. The great President, one

of the greatest men of the century now dying, who led his country through those awful years, and who finally laid down his life in her behalf, was elected President in 1860 by a minority of the popular vote. No, Mr. President, the existence of the Union was at stake in the civil war, and all questions about the consent of the governed went down into nothingness, as they deserved to go, in the presence of that master issue.

One more case and I have done with the list of expansions. In 1867 we purchased Alaska from Russia, territory, people and all. Let me call attention to article three. It is there said that—

the inhabitants of the ceded territory, according to their choice, reserving their natural allegiance, may return to Russia within three years, but if they should prefer to remain in the ceded territory they, with the exception of uncivilized native tribes, shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, and shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion. The uncivilized tribes will be subject to such laws and regulations as the United States may from time to time adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that country.

It will be observed that to the white inhabitants we allow the liberty of returning to Russia, but we except the uncivilized tribes specifically. They are to be governed without their consent, and they are not even to be allowed to become citizens. Why, only the other day, Mr. President, a great Democratic thinker announced that a republic could have no subjects. He seems to have forgotten that this Republic not only has held subjects from the beginning, in the persons of those whom we euphemistically call the "wards of the nation," but that, to our shame be it said, we once authorized the slave trade in our Constitution, and provided for fugitive-slave laws. More than this, if he had been familiar with the Alaskan treaty he would have known that we not only hold subjects, but have acquired them by purchase. This Alaskan treaty passed without serious opposition, and when the appropriation to carry it out went through the House the House added to the bill a specific approval of the treaty. This infringment of the constitutional right of the Senate was stricken out when it reached the treaty-making branch, but it is of interest because the House in voting for it gave formal approval to the treaty provisions. They approved of the provision which transferred the inhabitants without their consent to the jurisdiction of the United States, and which denied to the Indian tribes even the right to choose their allegiance, or to become citizens. It interested me to notice, although the point is a very unimportant one, that among those who in the House approved this vast acquisition of territory without the consent of the governed, and with the careful exclusion of the Indians from all rights, was my eminent fellow-citizen ex-Governor Boutwell.

Prophets of evil are not lacking to declare ruin inevitable if we persist in our career of expansion and in setting no fixed bounds to the progress of the country. Like the raven of Macbeth they croak themselves hoarse in predicting the downfall of the Republic. These dire forebodings are not new. Look back to the debates of 1803 and the succeeding years, and you will find there all that is being said now in almost the same language, and with the same certainty of swift-coming disaster. In view of the results of the Louisiana Purchase the gloomy prophecies of these old Cassandras look very queer and make us smile. But they are no queerer than the black predictions of their successors of to-day will appear to the next generation. The downfall of the Republic

has been constantly and confidently foretold many times since the foundation of the Government, generally on trivial grounds, and always when a great expansion of territory took place. Never has it come true. Only once was the great peril real and near, and that was not when men were trying to widen the bounds of the Republic, but when they sought to divide it and make it small.

Thus, Mr. President, I have reviewed our former acquisitions of territory. The record of American expansions which closes with Alaska has been a long one, and to-day we do but continue the same movement. The same policy runs through them all—the same general acceptance of the laws of nations, in regard to the transfer of territory, the same absence of any reference to the consent of the governed. It has not only been the American policy, it is the only policy practicable in such transactions. Why should we now be suddenly confronted with the objection that it is a crime to acquire the territories ceded to us by Spain in 1898, when we cheerfully accept all the previous cessions, which do not differ one whit in principle from the last? If the arguments which have been offered against our taking the Philippine Islands because we have not the consent of the inhabitants be just, then our whole past record of expansion is a crime, and Thomas Jefferson, and John Quincy Adams, and James Monroe, and all the rest of our Presidents and statesmen who have added to our national domain are traitors to the cause of liberty and to the Declaration of Independence. Does anyone really believe it? I think not. Then let us be honest and look at this whole question as it really is. I am not ashamed of that long record of American expansion. I am proud of it. I do not think that we violated in that record the principles of the Declaration of Independence. On the contrary, I think we spread them over regions where they were unknown. Guided by the principles of that record, I am proud of the treaty of Paris, which is but a continuance of our American policy. The taking of the Philippines does not violate the principles of the Declaration of Independence, but will spread them among a people who have never known liberty and who in a few years will be as unwilling to leave the shelter of the American flag as those of any other territory we ever brought beneath its folds.

The next argument of the opponents of the Republican policy is that we are denying self-government to the Filipinos. Our reply is that to give independent self-government at once, as we understand it, to a people who have no just conception of it and no fitness for it, is to dower them with a curse instead of a blessing. To do this would be to entirely arrest their progress instead of advancing them on the road to the liberty and free government which we wish them to achieve and enjoy. This contention rests, of course, on the proposition that the Filipinos are not to-day in the least fitted for self-government, as we understand it. The argument on this point is, I will admit, much simplified by the admissions of our opponents. The past, present, and prospective leader and Presidential candidate of the Democratic party said at Minneapolis, on January 10:

> I am a firm believer in the enlargement and extension of the limits of the republic. I don't mean by that the extension by the addition of contiguous territory, nor to limit myself to that.
>
> Wherever there is a people intelligent enough to form a part of this republic, it is my belief that they should be taken in. Wherever there is a people who are capable of having a voice and a representation in this government, there the limits of the republic may be extended.

The Filipinos are not such a people. The Democratic party has ever favored the extension of the limits of this republic; but it has never advocated the acquisition of subject territory to be held under colonial government.

I do not assert that this is his view to-day, for Mr. Bryan gives forth a great variety of opinions on a great variety of topics. I have not, unfortunately, either time or opportunity to indulge in the delight of reading all he says, for even if he does not from night to night show knowledge, he certainly from day to day uttereth speech. The passage that I have quoted seems, however, to be the last authentic deliverence on the subject, and in it Mr. Bryan distinctly admits that the Filipinos are unfit for self-government, as we understand it. What is far more important and to the purpose, the Senator from Washington, in the able and interesting speech which he delivered on this subject, has made the same admission. Thus our differences narrow. They think that we should abandon the Philippines because they are not fit for self-government. I believe that for that very reason we should retain them and lead them along the path of freedom until they are able to be self-governing, so far, at least, as all their own affairs are concerned. I should be glad to let the matter rest here and confine myself to this very narrow ground of difference, but, unfortunately, there are people who do not recognize facts so frankly as the Senator to whom I have referred, and who contend either that the Filipinos are fit for self-government in the highest acceptation of the term, or that it is our duty to withdraw and leave them to set up such a government as they can evolve for themselves.

I do not think the Filipinos are fit for self-government as we understand it, and I am certain that if we left them alone the result would be disastrous to them and discreditable to us. Left to themselves the islands, if history, facts, and experience teach anything, would sink into a great group of Haitis and St. Domingos, with this important difference, that there would be no Monroe doctrine to prevent other nations from interfering to put an end to the ruin of the people and the conversion of a fair land into a useless and unproductive waste. The nations of Europe are not going to stand idly by and see the islands of the Philippines given over to anarchy and dictatorships of the Haitian type, while their waters swarm again with pirates whom Spain suppressed, and whom we have now the responsibility of keeping down and extinguishing. We have no right to give those islands over to anarchy, tyrannies, and piracy, and I hope we have too much self-respect to hand them over to European powers with the confession that they can restore peace and order more kindly and justly than we, and lead the inhabitants onward to a larger liberty and a more complete self-government than we can bestow upon them. Therefore, Mr. President, I desire to show why I feel so confident that the Filipinos are not now fit for self-government, and that their only hope of reaching the freedom, self-government, and civilization which we desire them to have lies in our now holding, governing, and controlling the islands.

Let us look first for a moment at the new territory of which we have thus become the possessors. The Philippine group extends over a distance of 1,000 miles north and south. The large-scale maps show that it consists of 1,725 islands, great and small. Of these at least 60 are over 20 miles square. Geographically, therefore, it is a broken and separated territory, scattered over a wide extent of ocean. It is physically without unity or

connection. The best statistics—and the best are poor—indicate that there is a population in all the islands of over 8,000,000. This population consists of different races, of many tribes—President Schurman and Professor Worcester say there are 84—speaking 50 or 60 languages and dialects. Most of these people are of the Malay stock, but in many of the tribes the Malay blood is greatly mixed. One division consists of the Negritos, few in number, and steadily declining, who are ethnically totally different from the Malays, largely savage wanderers in the mountainous and wooded interiors of the islands, and who are in the lowest stage of barbarism. They are racially as different from the Malays as we are. Another, and a large division, consists of people of what is sometimes called the Indonesian stock, who are physically a finer race than the Malays, but who are still entirely uncivilized, and who are pagans in religion. There are also in the interior many wild and barbarous Malay tribes with no conception of government whatever, except in the case of certain of them like the Macabebes, who have one fixed political idea, which is that they will fight the Tagals to the death and will unite with anyone against them. The Malay tribes are almost as widely divided among themselves as from the Negritos. Those of the Sulu archipelago and Mindanao are Mohammedans, and bitter foes of the Christianized Malays of Luzon, and among the Christianized Malays some are as hostile to the Tagals as they are to the Moros, while the wild tribes, or "Infieles," are hostile to both. The islands fell an easy prey to the Spanish conquerors, because there was no unity among them. They were occupied by detached tribes living under the despotism of local chiefs. There was no consolidation, no unity, even among the inhabitants of a single island. The Filipinos have never been either a people or a nation. There has never been any single sovereignty there, or any central government, except that of Spain, to which we succeeded. To accept the Tagal followers of Aguinaldo as representing the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands would be just as intelligent as to hold that because William Penn made a treaty with the Delawares we thereby bound and were bound to the Sioux, Pawnees, and Apaches, who roamed over the great plains of the West. There has never been a Filipino nation, there has never been a Filipino government, there is not a scintilla of evidence that at any period they had any central government whatever or were capable of having any form of government larger than a village community which was not an unrestrained Asiatic despotism, whether exercised by a Sultan in the Mohammedan regions or by some military dictator of like political instincts among those who had come under the rule and example of Spain. Of self-government, as we understand it or as it is understood by Western civilization, there has never been the faintest conception in the Philippine Islands, and there never will be unless we give them the opportunity, and by slow processes teach them what it is. Geographically and ethnically—because they are scattered islands and because the people are divided among eighty-four tribes in all stages of development, from savagery to civilization, speaking fifty or sixty different dialects or languages, with every form of religion—they are to-day not only unfit for self-government, but from the physical facts alone self-government is impossible to the Philippines as a whole. There must be one central, strong, civilized power which shall control all the islands and thus give them in the only possible way the opportunity of rising to freedom and home rule.

The capacity of a people, moreover, for free and representative government is not in the least a matter of guesswork. The forms of government to which nations or races naturally tend may easily be discovered from history. You can follow the story of political freedom and representative government among the English-speaking people back across the centuries until you reach the Teutonic tribes emerging from the forests of Germany and bringing with them forms of local self-government which are repeated to-day in the pure democracies of the New England town meeting. The tendencies and instincts of the Teutonic race which, reaching from the Arctic Circle to the Alps, swept down upon the Roman Empire, were clear at the outset. Yet the individual freedom and the highly developed forms of free government in which these tendencies and instincts have culminated in certain countries and under the most favorable conditions have been the slow growth of nearly fifteen hundred years.

There never has been, on the other hand, the slightest indication of any desire for what we call freedom or representative government east of Constantinople. The battle of Marathon was but the struggle between a race which had the instinct and desire for freedom and the opposite principle. The form of government natural to the Asiatic has always been a despotism. You may search the history of Asia and of the East for the slightest trace, not merely of any understanding, but of any desire for political liberty, as we understand the word. In the village communities of India, in the Mura of Japan, in the towns and villages of China you can find forms of local self-government which are as successful as they are ancient. The Malays of Java and of the Philippines as well display the same capacity, and on this old and deep-rooted practice the self-government of provinces and states can, under proper auspices, be built up. It is just here that our work ought to begin. But this local self-government never went beyond the town or the village; it never grew and spread, as was the case with the Teutonic tribes and their descendants. The only central, state or national governments which the Eastern and Asiatic people have formed or set up have been invariably despotisms. They may have been tempered by assassination and palace intrigues, the revolts of factions may have changed dynasties, the wave of conquest may have ebbed and flowed, but the principle of the unlimited power of one man, of the pure despot, whether it be Xerxes or Genghis Khan, the Sultan of Sulu or an adventurer like Aguinaldo, has never failed and has maintained an undisputed acceptance throughout all the vast regions of the East.

You can not change race tendencies in a moment. Habits of thought slowly formed through long periods of time and based on physical, climatic, and geographical peculiarities are more indestructible than the pyramids themselves. Only by very slow processes can they be modified or changed. Buckle's theory, that you could make a Hottentot into a European if you only took possession of him in infancy and gave him a European education among suitable surroundings, has been abandoned alike by science and history as grotesquely false. It is perhaps possible for an extremely clever and superior people like the Japanese, with their unsurpassed capacity of imitation, to adopt western forms of government, but whether the underlying conceptions—which are the only solid foundation of free institutions—can exist under such circumstances is yet to be proved, and all human experience is

against the theory. These political conceptions are of very slow growth even among the races whose natural tendencies and instincts lead toward them, but in the particular instance which we are called upon to consider we are not left in the dark. We know what sort of government the Malay makes when he is left to himself. Study the history of the Malay States, and you will find that before the advent of the British residents they were governed by despotic chiefs, and their condition was one of incessant private or public war, coupled with a condition of society little, if any, short of anarchy. But we have an even better example in the Philippine Islands themselves. In the Sulu group, and in the island of Mindanao you find perfect types of the government which the Malay, when left to himself, naturally produces. These islands are ruled by sultans, who are supposed to have a general authority, and more directly by datos, or local chiefs. Every one of these governments is a personal despotism of a more or less murderous character. The people of the islands which fell under the control of Spain have changed their religion, but they have not changed their habits of mind or their natural instincts. Give them unhampered liberty to do what they like and you would have the governments of Sulu or Mindanao repeated. There would be modifications unquestionably, because Christianity has modified the character of the people, but their political instincts are unchanged, and the only model of civilized government which they have had opportunity to know is the corrupt and broken rule of the Spaniard, who has himself emerged from despotism less than a hundred years ago. I am far from criticising or finding fault with the people about whom I make this statement. Aguinaldo's government was a pure military dictatorship. He took possession of the governmental machinery of Spain, such as it was, but the military power, as you may see by referring to the account of the two naval officers who traveled throughout the island, was everywhere dominant. In Negros, which was friendly to us from the beginning, we gave the people the utmost latitude to do as they liked. They set up a government of their own and chose their best men for office. It broke down, and they came of their own accord to our general and asked him to again assume control. They were not fit to carry on a general government for themselves, and they themselves recognized it. Free government, as we know it, is no child's play to be learned in a moment. A republic like our own we know to be the freest and the most representative government on earth, but we are apt to forget that it is also the most complicated and the most difficult. We are so accustomed to it that we do not remember that it is the result not merely of centuries of struggle, but, what is far more important, of a training and a mental habit which stretch back to the twilight of history.

Is it to be supposed that a people whose every instinct, every mode of thought, and every prejudice is hostile to what we consider the commonplaces of political existence are going to take up in the twinkling of an eye and work successfully the most intricate forms of self-government ever devised by man? To make such an assumption is not only to betray an utter ignorance of history, but is to give the lie to all human experience. We must not confuse names with things. It does not follow because a government is called a republic that it is therefore a free government, as we understand it; or because it is called a monarchy that it is therefore a tyranny or a despotism. To the south of us lie many

governments called republics. Are they free governments, as we understand the term? He would be a bold man who would undertake to answer that question in the affirmative. Haiti and Santo Domingo are called republics, and yet they are bloody tyrannies. The condition they create is anarchy. Neither life, liberty, nor property is safe, and as the island slides downward in the scale of civilization the controlling power shifts from the hands of one military adventurer to those of another. Because they are called republics, will anyone say that they are freer, more representative, better for individual liberty and for civilization than the Government of Holland, which is called a monarchy? Again I say, let us not confuse names with things. The problem we have before us is to give to people who have no conception of free government, as we understand it and carry it on, the opportunity to learn that lesson. What better proof could there be of their present unfitness for self-government than their senseless attacks upon us before anything had been done? Could anything demonstrate more fully the need of time and opportunity to learn the principles of self-government than this assault upon liberators and friends at the bidding of a self-seeking, self-appointed, unscrupulous autocrat and dictator? Some of the inhabitants of the Philippines, who have had the benefit of Christianity and of a measure of education, will, I have no doubt, under our fostering care and with peace and order, assume at once a degree of self-government and advance constantly, with our aid, toward a still larger exercise of that inestimable privilege, but to abandon those islands is to leave them to anarchy, to short-lived military dictatorships, to the struggle of factions, and, in a very brief time, to their seizure by some great Western power who will not be at all desirous to train them in the principles of freedom, as we are, but who will take them because the world is no longer large enough to permit some of its most valuable portions to lie barren and ruined, the miserable results of foolish political experiments.

Now, Mr. President, before discussing the advantages to the United States which will accrue from our possession of these islands, I desire to state briefly the course of our action there since the outbreak of the insurrection. I can do that best by dealing directly with an assertion that has been reiterated here to the effect that in some way we recognized the government which Aguinaldo set up, a government representing all the Filipinos and founded on their assent, and that therefore we have been doing those people a great wrong and have been engaged in a war of conquest, or, in the cant phrase, of "criminal aggression."

On March 31, 1898, Admiral Dewey sent a dispatch to the Navy Department in which he stated the condition of affairs at Manila, because he already foresaw that if war should break out with Spain that would be the point of attack.[1] He gave a list of the Spanish ships there, some statements in regard to the batteries and the soldiers, and then said that the islands were in a state of insurrection, and that he had been informed that there were 5,000 armed rebels in camp near Manila. A month later he was on his way to the Philippines, and on the 1st of May fought the battle which resulted in the destruction of the Spanish fleet. After the battle was over Admiral Dewey found that he had been entirely misinformed by Mr. Williams, our consul at Manila, as

[1] See United States Senate Document No. 73, first session Fifty-sixth Congress.

to the existence of an insurrection in the islands. He also found that there was no organized insurgent force of any kind, and that the information that there were 5,000 armed insurgents near Manila was absolutely without foundation. No such force existed. Before he left Mirs Bay the admiral had been put into communication with Aguinaldo through Mr. Pratt, our consul at Singapore. What happened is completely stated in a memorandum furnished to the Philippine Commission by Admiral Dewey, and to be found on page 6 of their preliminary report, which I will now read:

MEMORANDUM OF RELATIONS WITH AGUINALDO.

On April 24, 1898, the following cipher dispatch was received at Hongkong from Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, United States consul-general at Singapore:

"Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong. Arrange with commodore for general cooperation insurgents, Manila, if desired. Telegraph.

"PRATT."

On the same day Commodore Dewey telegraphed Mr. Pratt, "Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible," the necessity for haste being due to the fact that the squadron had been notified by the Hongkong Government to leave those waters by the following day. The squadron left Hongkong on the morning of the 25th, and Mirs Bay on the 27th. Aguinaldo did not leave Singapore until the 26th, and so did not arrive in Hongkong in time to have a conference with the admiral.

It had been reported to the commodore as early as March 1, by the United States consul at Manila and others, that the Filipinos had broken out into insurrection against the Spanish authority in the vicinity of Manila, and on March 30 Mr. Williams had telegraphed: "Five thousand rebels armed in camp near city. Loyal to us in case of war."

Upon the arrival of the squadron at Manila it was found that there was no insurrection to speak of, and it was accordingly decided to allow Aguinaldo to come to Cavite on board the *McCulloch*. He arrived with thirteen of his staff on May 19, and immediately came on board the *Olympia* to call on the commander in chief, after which he was allowed to land at Cavite and organize an army. This was done with the purpose of strengthening the United States forces and weakening those of the enemy. No alliance of any kind was entered into with Aguinaldo, nor was any promise of independence made to him, then or at any other time.

Thus it will be seen that there was no insurrection in the islands; that the movement which had been brought to an end by the treaty of Biac-Na-Bato had died out, and that Admiral Dewey had caused Aguinaldo to be brought over in the hope of reviving the native resistance to the Spaniards, which was a judicious military measure in view of the fact that Admiral Dewey had no United States troops with which to carry on land operations. Aguinaldo, as stated in the memorandum, arrived in Manila on the 19th of May. The next day Admiral Dewey cabled:

Aguinaldo, the rebel commander in chief, was brought down by the *McCulloch*. Organizing forces near Cavite, and may render assistance which will be valuable.[1]

At first Aguinaldo seemed to get little support, and was so discouraged that he talked of returning to Hongkong, but was urged to remain by Admiral Dewey, and after a short time the natives began to gather in the neighborhood of Cavite, and Admiral Dewey furnished them with some arms from the arsenal at that place. Thus it will be seen that there was no insurrection against the Spaniards when Dewey arrived, and that the whole movement was created and made possible by the victory of May 1, and could have had no existence without the American support. On May 26 the Secretary of the Navy telegraphed to Admiral Dewey:

It is desirable, as far as possible, and consistent for your success and safety,

[1] See Abridgments of Messages and Documents, 1898-99, vol. 4, page 100.

not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future.[1]

On May 30 Dewey telegraphed to the Secretary of the Navy:

Aguinaldo, revolutionary leader, visited the *Olympia* yesterday. He expects to make a general attack on May 31.[2]

And on June 6 he cabled, in reply to the dispatch of May 26:

Receipt of telegram of May 26 is acknowledged, and I thank the Department for the expression of confidence. Have acted according to the spirit of Department's instructions therein from the beginning, and I have entered into no alliance with the insurgents or with any faction. This squadron can reduce the defenses of Manila at any moment, but it is considered useless until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain possession.[2]

I wish to draw most particular attention to these dispatches. It is very important to notice that within a week after the arrival of Aguinaldo the Administration at Washington cabled Admiral Dewey that there must be no political alliances of any sort with the native insurgents. Thus at the very start was the attitude of the Administration clearly defined, and from that attitude the President never departed. Now note Admiral Dewey's reply. He says that he has acted in accordance with the instructions of the Administration from the beginning; that he has entered into no alliance with the insurgents or with any faction, and he adds that he could reduce the defenses of Manila at any moment without their aid, and does not do it simply because he thinks it better to wait until troops arrive from the United States. Nothing could be clearer or plainer than the facts set forth in these dispatches. Before Aguinaldo had started what he called his government the Administration had directed that there should be no political alliance with any faction of the natives, and the Admiral replied that there never had been nor ever would be any.

Mr. President, there is not the slightest ground upon which to found the assertion which has been made here and elsewhere that Aguinaldo or his government, after he had made it, received the slightest recognition from the Government of the United States. That loosely written and wholly unauthorized letters were sent him by some of our consuls I well know, but when or by what code of international law or where in the Constitution or the laws of the United States is it set down that the letter of a consul, who is not a diplomatic officer and has no authority to speak for his Government, constitutes a recognition of another government? Such a claim is preposterous, and the only persons affected by those consular letters are the consuls themselves. It has been asserted on this floor and elsewhere that Admiral Dewey saluted the so-called Filipino flag. We know from Admiral Dewey's letter which I read to the Senate, as well as from the official dispatches of the time, that that assertion is absolutely false. It has been asserted here and elsewhere, and particularly by Mr. Mabini, who figured as Aguinaldo's secretary of state, that Aguinaldo was received by Admiral Dewey on the *Olympia* with military honors. This again, as we know from Admiral Dewey's letter which I read to the Senate, is absolutely false. It has also been said that Admiral Dewey recognized Aguinaldo and his government by turning Spanish prisoners over to them. This is founded on the Subig Bay incident. The insurgents had taken posession of Subig Bay,

[1] See Abridgement of Messages and Documents, 1898-99, vol. 4, page 101.
[2] See Abridgement of Messages and Documents, 1898-99, vol. 4, page 102.

but could not take the Isla Grande, where the Spaniards had a considerable force, because the German cruiser *Irene* was in the harbor and prevented them and because of the garrison. Admiral Dewey, on July 7, sent the *Raleigh* and *Concord* to Subig Bay. Exactly what occurred is best told in the following extract from a letter addressed to me by Capt. Coghlan, the captain of the *Raleigh:*

FEBRUARY 1, 1900.

MY DEAR SENATOR LODGE:

* * * * * * *

I was in command of the expedition sent by the Admiral (*Raleigh* and *Concord*) to the mouth of Subig Bay, July 6, 1898, to capture Grande Island, then held by the Spaniards. I wish to affirm as strongly as human words can do so that Aguinaldo's people did not accompany us, and that they took no part whatever in that capture. No one but the Admiral, Lieutenant Brumby, Captain Walker, and myself even knew where we were to go. We left at midnight, without lights of any kind, not even signaling, as usual, for permission to get under way, and no one knew except the flagship and a vessel or two near us, that the vessels (*Raleigh* and *Concord*) had moved from their berths. It was not known until next morning that we had gone out of sight of our fleet. At this very time the so-called gunboat of Aguinaldo was anchored at Cavite, and did not learn of our departure until next day about noon. We captured Grande Island about 10.30 a. m., July 7, and no Filipino boat of any description appeared about Subig Bay until that evening about 7 p. m., when the boat we had left at Cavite came in and expressed the greatest surprise at our capture, telling us they had hoped to take part in the attack. So far as Aguinaldo's people having anything to do with the capture, after it had been done I instructed their chief at Alongapo, about 5 miles up the bay, that his people must in no way bother with the island, and to prevent them I moved the *Raleigh* out into the bay, where the searchlights were used all night to see that no insurgent went near the island. In my opinion, those on the island could have held out indefinitely, as they were well provided with everything, and the Aguinaldoites had no artillery—one small gun only on their so-called gunboat, the rest of her armament (?) consisting of pieces of 3-inch pipe stuck through chocks and holes in her sides to simulate guns.

There may not be much glory arising from that capture, but on behalf of my naval comrades, who did it alone, I object to having any of it taken away by anyone attempting to falsely assign us help.

Yours, very truly,

(Signed) J. B. COGHLAN,
Captain, U. S. N.

The *Irene* withdrew and the American ships *Raleigh* and *Concord*, as Captain Coghlan states, then took the island. It will also be noted that Aguinaldo's boat was not convoyed and did not go up with our vessels and had no part in the capture. We had no land forces, and our naval force was unable to take or provide for the six or seven hundred Spanish prisoners, but the insurgents were not allowed to hold the island or its garrison until they had given the most absolute pledges of humane treatment to the Spaniards who fell into their hands.[1] In this instance, at least, the pledges were fulfilled.

But suppose, Mr. President, that all these statements about saluting the flag, giving military honors, and turning captured prisoners over were true instead of false, as all but the last are, what then? Neither singly nor all together would they have constituted the slightest foundation for the claim that we had recognized Aguinaldo either as an ally or as a government. After the war broke out with Spain we were in constant communication with the insurgent forces in Cuba. We supplied them with arms and ammunition. We landed parties to assist them. At Santiago their generals were in constant communication and conference with our naval and military officers, and they cooperated with us in our military operations in that region. An effort has been

[1] See Abridgment of Messages and Documents, 1898-99, vol. 4, page 110.

made to twist a sentence in Admiral Dewey's letter into an admission that he really made allies of the insurgents. His statement was that he—

Never treated them as allies, but used them in his operations against the Spaniards.

Familiar with the laws and language of war, Admiral Dewey's statement was as exact as it was true. Using troops or individuals in war does not make them either the political or military allies of the power using them. George III, for example, used Hessians in his operations against us, but the Hessians were not his allies—they were his mercenaries. We never cooperated with the Filipinos. We scrupulously avoided any connection with them. We never consulted with them in regard to our military operations. In a word, we carefully refrained from maintaining with them any of the relations in which we freely engaged with the Cubans. Yet will anyone undertake to say that by our treatment and relations with the Cuban army we recognized the Cuban Republic, which those armies served? No one ever suggested or would think of suggesting such a manifest absurdity, and with this fact known to everybody there are still persons who undertake to say that we recognized Aguinaldo as a government, when we never had the relations with him which we had with the Cubans, and when from the beginning our naval and military representatives in the Philippines, under the explicit direction of the Administration, refrained with the most minute care from any act which could be construed into a recognition of any sort of Aguinaldo and his followers, whether as an ally or a government. The case is so plain that I almost feel that I ought to ask the pardon of the Senate for even stating it. Governments are not recognized by the careless letters of consuls nor by the unauthorized acts of military or naval officers, and in this instance no military or naval officer ever committed any act which could possibly be construed as even suggesting recognition. The recognition of one government by another is a much more serious business than this. It must be the solemn act of the constituted authority of the recognizing government. When Secretary Long sent the dispatch of May 26 he established the position of our Government. The only authority in the United States capable of recognizing another government said within a week after Aguinaldo landed at Cavite that there was to be no political alliance with the insurgents or any faction of the natives. The only person who could give recognition on the part of the United States was the President, and his orders of the 26th of May, transmitted through the Secretary of the Navy, declared that there was to be none. There has been no alteration since the date of that dispatch in the attitude of our Government, and while that dispatch stood, while the President held that position, no act of anyone in the Philippines, even if such had been committed, and none such was committed, could by any possibility have caused a recognition by the United States of any government, real or alleged, in those islands.

But, Mr. President, there are some persons—very few, I think—who are indifferent to facts, who care nothing for the testimony of the official records, who will not accept the word of the President, or of the Secretary of the Navy, or of Admiral Dewey or of the generals of the United States, in regard to any transaction in the Philippines. For the benefit of those persons I desire to call, on this point, another witness, one in whose veracity I have

not myself the slightest confidence, but whom I cite in this instance because here he is testifying against himself and against the contention which his friends make in his behalf. On January 5, 1899, when Aguinaldo was engaged in rousing his followers to attack the Americans, he issued a proclamation in which he set forth his grievances. Among the many complaints which he made I extract the following:

> The American generals not only ignored me entirely in the stipulations for capitulation, but also requested that my forces should retire from the port of Cavite and the suburbs of Manila.
> I represented to the American generals the injustice done me, and requested in friendly terms that they should at least expressly recognize my cooperation but they utterly declined to do so.
> In spite of these concessions (Aguinaldo's withdrawal of his army), not many days passed before Admiral Dewey, without any reason whatever, arrested our steam launches, which had been plying in the bay of Manila with his express consent.[1]

On January 9 Aguinaldo addressed a letter to General Otis, in which he said:

> I have been informed after the interview between the commissioners of my government and Mr. Carman that there will be no inconvenience on your part in naming, as commanding general, representatives that will confer with those whom I will name for the same object.
> Although it not being explained to me the reason why you could not treat with the commissioners of my government, I have the faculty for doing the same with those of the commanding general "who can not be recognized."[2]

On January 23 he wrote another letter to General Otis, announcing the promulgation of the political constitution of the Philippine republic, and used the following language in the last clause:

> And taking the liberty of notifying your excellency, I confidently hope that doing justice to the Philippine people you will be pleased to inform the Government of your nation that the desire of mine, *upon being accorded official recognition*, is to contribute to the best of its scanty ability to the establishment of a general peace.[3]

Thus it will be seen that Aguinaldo himself says that our generals declined to recognize his cooperation in the siege of Manila or to let him take part in the stipulations for capitulation. He further complained that Admiral Dewey had seized his steam launches, a perfectly proper military precaution against an attack by the insurgents, which Admiral Dewey justly apprehended, but something which he would hardly have done to an ally or a government recognized by him. On January 9 Aguinaldo complains that General Otis will not recognize his commissioners in any formal way, and on January 23 he admits that no recognition had been accorded to the Philippine republic. On February 4 hostilities began, just a week after this last admission, and I do not think that even the most enthusiastic friend and admirer of Aguinaldo could claim that we have recognized him as anything but an enemy since the fighting started. Thus is it proved by Aguinaldo's own admissions that never in the slightest way did our military or naval officers give him any recognition as an ally, much less as a government.

Let me now return to the narrative of events. On the 24th of May, 1898, Aguinaldo issued three proclamations, one containing decrees as to the treatment of the enemy, another announcing the establishment of a dictatorial government by himself and

[1] See Report of Major-General Otis for 1899, page 77.
[2] See report of Major-General Otis for 1899, page 80.
[3] See report of Major-General Otis for 1899, page 85.

with himself as dictator, and the third containing further decrees with reference to carrying on military operations. This government was the pure creation of Aguinaldo himself, and was a simple seizure of power.[1] The natives were now flocking to his standard, and the Spaniards being rendered helpless through Dewey's victory, the insurgents began to spread over the island and cut off outlying Spanish garrisons. During all this time Admiral Dewey carefully refrained from assisting Aguinaldo with the force under his command, and declined his request to do so, telling him the squadron could not act until the arrival of United States troops. He treated him as a friend, but kept aloof from his confidence and consistently held to the position that the United States was not bound to assist the insurgents or the insurgents to assist the United States.[2]

Whatever the insurgents did was done voluntarily but the increase of his force and his success against the Spanish garrisons very soon had the effect of completely turning Aguinaldo's head, and on June 18 he established what he called a revolutionary government, of which he made himself president by proclamation on July 1.[3] This was a mere extension of the dictatorial government under a new name to civil as well as military affairs. The first detachment of our army arrived on July 3, the second on July 20. Our army officers maintained toward Aguinaldo the same attitude as that of Admiral Dewey, refusing to cooperate with the insurgents or to recognize them in any way, treating them merely as a friendly force opposed to a common enemy; but Aguinaldo, rapidly enlarging his pretensions, as his sense of his own importance passed beyond his control, in July declared martial law to exist over all the islands; that is, he asserted his authority, which was purely dictatorial, over islands inhabited by different tribes, and where he had not the slightest foothold or the faintest claim of any kind.[4]

On July 25, 1898, General Merritt arrived and took command of all the military forces of the United States. The following dispatch from Admiral Dewey exactly describes the situation and shows how Aguinaldo had already begun to threaten the forces of the United States, without whose assistance he would have been vegetating in a forgotten exile at Singapore or Hongkong. The dispatch is as follows:

> Merritt arrived yesterday in the *Newport*. The remainder of the expedition is expected within the next few days. Situation is most critical at Manila. The Spanish may surrender at any moment. Merritt's most difficult problem will be how to deal with insurgents under Aguinaldo, who has become aggressive and even threatening toward our army.[5]

It is important to note at this point that the hostility of Aguinaldo and his followers was so threatening on July 25, 1898, as to embarrass our operations for the capture of the city. This disposes entirely of the idea that we forced resistance upon Aguinaldo. He had begun to manifest hostility toward us even before Manila had fallen, and he did so because he had begun to understand that we would not allow him to loot the city, a distinct interference with his right to liberty and self-government. Utterly unmindful of what he owed us, and of the fact that if we had

[1] See Abridgment of Messages and Documents, 1898-99, volume 4, page 104.
[2] See Abridgment of Messages and Documents, 1898-99, volume 4, page 103.
[3] See Abridgment of Messages and Documents, 1898-99, volume 4, page 111.
[4] See Abridgment of Messages and Documents, 1898-99, volume 4, page 113.
[5] See Abridgment of Messages and Documents, 1898-99, volume 4, page 118.

withdrawn our troops and ships he could never have overcome the Spaniards alone, he was none the less plotting against a friendly power to whom the very existence of himself and his army was due. I can not give the history of the events which followed the dispatch just quoted better than in the words of the Commission composed of Admiral Dewey, General Otis, President Schurman, Professor Worcester, and General Denby in their preliminary report.

Upon landing and joining the troops at Camp Dewey, Brigadier-General Anderson, the ranking brigadier-general, assumed command of the division. Shortly afterwards, upon the arrival of General Merritt, the insurgents were notified that our troops intended to commence operations against Manila, and would establish a line of works commencing at the base and extending east in front of the outposts then maintained by them. This movement was not received kindly by the Filipinos, but on the establishment of our line on their front they gradually retired. There were no conferences between the officers of the Filipinos and our officers with a view of operating against the Spaniards, nor was there any cooperation of any kind between the respective forces, and the relations between the two forces were strained from the beginning. Upon our landing they furnished our forces no protection nor support. The natives objected to our establishing camps, and were only quieted by the assurance that the United States would pay for all the damage done and for all wood and other articles consumed. There never was any preconcerted operation, or any combined movement by the United States and the Filipinos against the Spaniards. When the city of Manila was taken on August 13, the Filipinos took no part in the attack, but came following in with a view of looting the city and were only prevented from doing so by our forces preventing them from entering. Aguinaldo claimed that he had the right to occupy the city; he demanded of General Merritt the cession of the Palace of Malacañan for himself, and the cession of all the churches of Manila, Paco, and Ermita, and also that a part of the money which was taken from the Spaniards as spoils of war should be given up, and above all that he be given the arms of the Spanish prisoners This confirms the statement already made that he intended to get possession of these arms for the purpose of attacking us. All these demands were refused.

After the taking of Manila the feeling between the Americans and the insurgents grew worse day by day. All manner of abuses were indulged in by the insurgent troops, who committed assaults and robberies, and under the order of General Pio del Pilar even kidnaped natives who were friendly toward the Americans and carried them off into the mountains or killed them. In the interest of law and order it became necessary to order the Filipino forces back, and this order made them angry. Aguinaldo removed his seat of government to Malolos, where the so-called Filipino congress assembled. The anti-American feeling was steadily nourished by the Filipino newspapers, which were directed to foster it. At this time Sandico began to establish what were called "popular clubs" in Manila and the neighboring villages and towns. Ostensibly they were intended to promote social intercourse and the instruction of the people; their actual object was to provoke bitterness toward the Americans. Their influence was far-reaching, and from their membership was recruited later on the local militia, which was to attack us from within Manila while the regular insurgent troops attacked us from without.

On the 21st of September a significant decree passed the Filipino congress imposing military service on every male over 18 years of age, excepting those holding government positions. In every carriage factory and blacksmith shop in Manila bolos (knives) were being made.

It is in proof before us that Aguinaldo was urged at this time to make some immediate determination in regard to the settlement of affairs with the Americans. At this time we were about to discuss the future of the Philippines in Paris, and many of the leading Filipinos believed that America would abandon this country. It was made plain to Aguinaldo that it was not enough for the Filipinos to desire America to stay in the islands, but that it would be desirable for them to show America that it would be to her interest to keep the country. Aguinaldo was advised to write President McKinley and ask what desires he had about the country and what form of government he wished to establish, and to ask him not to abandon the Filipinos. This view was accepted not only by the government, but by many members of the Filipino congress. There was, however, considerable opposition, especially from Paterno, Mabini, and Sandico. While it seemed to appear that the sovereignty of America was acceptable to Aguinaldo, still he was always urging the military men to prepare for war. The cabinet at Malolos decided to send to the President of the United States the propositions above mentioned,

but Aguinaldo did not wish to do so. He first stated that he desired to translate them into Tagalog, and afterwards that he wished to put them into cipher, and so delayed the sending of them.

Danger signals now multiplied. Aguinaldo endeavored to get the war-making power transferred from Congress to himself. He also urged a heavy bond issue to secure one million dollars for the purchase of arms and ammunition. It is now known that elaborate plans had been perfected for a simultaneous attack by the forces within and without Manila. The militia within the city numbered approximately ten thousand; they were armed for the most part with bolos. General Pio del Pilar slept in the city every night. No definite date had been set for the attack, but a signal by means of rockets had been agreed upon, and it was universally understood that it would come upon the occurrence of the first act on the part of American forces which would afford a pretext; and in the lack of such act in the near future at all events. Persistent attempts were made to provoke our soldiers to fire. The insurgents were insolent to our guards and made persistent and continuous efforts to push them back and advance the insurgent lines further into the city of Manila. It was a long and trying period of insult and abuse heaped upon our soldiers, with constant submission as the only means of avoiding an open rupture. The Filipinos had concluded that our soldiers were cowards and boasted openly that we were afraid of them. Rumors were always prevalent that our army would be attacked at once.

With great tact and patience the commanding general had held his forces in check, and he now made a final effort to preserve the peace by appointing a commission to meet a similar body appointed by Aguinaldo and to "confer with regard to the situation of affairs and to arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent, purposes, aims, and desires of the Filipino people and of the people of the United States." Six sessions were held, the last occurring on January 29, six days before the outbreak of hostilities. No substantial results were obtained; the Filipino commissioners being either unable or unwilling to give any definite statements of the "intent, purposes, and aims of their people;" at the close of the last session they were given full assurances that no hostile act would be inaugurated by the United States troops.

The critical moment had now arrived. Aguinaldo secretly ordered the Filipinos who were friendly to him to seek refuge outside the city. The Nebraska regiment at that time was in camp on the east line at Santa Mesa, and was guarding its front. For days before the memorable 4th of February, 1899, the outposts in front of the regiment had been openly menaced and assaulted by insurgent soldiers; they were attempting to push our outposts back and advance their line. They made light of our sentinels and persistently ignored their orders.

On the evening of the 4th of February an insurgent officer came to the front with a detail of men and attempted to pass the guard on the San Juan bridge, our guard being stationed at the west end of the bridge. The Nebraska sentinel drove them back without firing, but a few minutes before 9 o'clock that evening a large body of insurgent troops made an advance on the South Dakota outposts, which fell back rather than fire. About the same time the insurgents came in force to the east end of the San Juan bridge, in front of the Nebraska regiment. For several nights prior thereto a lieutenant in the insurgent army had been coming regularly to our outpost No. 2, of the Nebraska regiment, and attempting to force the outpost back and insisting on posting his guard within the Nebraska lines; and at this time and in the darkness he again appeared with a detail of about six men and approached Private Grayson, of Company D, First Nebraska Volunteers, the sentinel on duty at outpost No. 2. He, after halting them three times without effect, fired, killing the lieutenant, whose men returned the fire and then retreated. Immediately rockets were sent up by the Filipinos, and they commenced firing all along the line.

The story of the actual fighting has often been told by military men who were engaged in it, and we do not deem it necessary to give a description of it here. It is known of all men that immediately after the first shot the insurgents opened fire all along their line and continued to fire until about midnight; and about 4 o'clock on the morning of February 5 the insurgents again opened fire all around the city and kept it up until the Americans charged them and drove them with great slaughter out of their trenches.

After the landing of our troops, Aguinaldo made up his mind that it would be necessary to fight the Americans, and after the making of the treaty of peace at Paris this determination was strengthened. He did not openly declare that he intended to fight the Americans, but he excited everybody, and especially the military men, by claiming independence, and it is doubtful whether he had the power to check or control the army at the time hostilities broke out. Deplorable as war is, the one in which we are now engaged was unavoidable by us. We were attacked by a bold, adventurous, and enthusiastic army. No alternative was left to us, except ignominious retreat. It is not to be conceived of that any American would have sanctioned the surren-

der of Manila to the insurgents. Our obligations to other nations, and to the friendly Filipinos, and to ourselves and our flag demanded that force should be met by force. Whatever the future of the Philippines may be, there is no course open to us now except the prosecution of the war until the insurgents are reduced to submission. The commission is of the opinion that there has been no time since the destruction of the Spanish squadron by Admiral Dewey when it was possible to withdraw our forces from the islands either with honor to ourselves or with safety to the inhabitants.

This account of events leading up the insurgent outbreak really needs no addition, but as it is constantly reiterated that we began the war because an American soldier fired the first shot, it is perhaps well to say a single word on that point. For some time before February 4 the insurgents had been insulting our soldiers, pressing upon our outposts, and trying to break through our lines. On February 2 they sent a party to draw the fire of our outposts and failed. On February 4 they succeeded. To declare that because our sentinel fired the first shot we began the war is as absurd as to say that because a householder fires on a burglar breaking into his house he has attacked a peaceful citizen, or because a policeman fires on a mob trying to sack a public building, that the officer of the law began a riot. The sentinel was simply doing his military duty and the only criticism that could properly be made is, not that he fired, but that he refrained so long and under such serious and menacing provocation from doing so. We are not left in the dark, however, upon this point. The action of the insurgents makes their intentions clear. The moment the firing began rockets went up and there was a general movement of the insurgent lines. That night, also, Aguinaldo issued the following proclamation declaring war:

GENERAL ORDER TO THE PHILIPPINE ARMY.

Nine o'clock p. m., this date, I received from Caloocan station a message communicated to me that the American forces, without prior notification or any just motive, attacked our camp at San Juan del Monte and our forces garrisoning the blockhouses around the outskirts of Manila, causing losses among our soldiers, who, in view of this unexpected aggression and of the decided attack of the aggressors, were obliged to defend themselves until the firing became general all along the line.

No one can deplore more than I this rupture of hostilities. I have a clear conscience that I have endeavored to avoid it at all costs, using all my efforts to preserve friendship with the army of occupation, even at the cost of not a few humiliations and many sacrificed rights.

But it is my unavoidable duty to maintain the integrity of the national honor and that of the army so unjustly attacked by those who, posing as our friends and liberators, attempted to dominate us in place of the Spaniards, as is shown by the grievances enumerated in my manifest of January 8 last; such as the continued outrages and violent exactions committed against the people of Manila, the useless conferences, and all my frustrated efforts in favor of peace and concord.

Summoned by this unexpected provocation, urged by the duties imposed upon me by honor and patriotism and for the defense of the nation intrusted to me, calling on God as a witness of my good faith and the uprightness of my intentions—

I order and command:

1. Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occupation are broken, and the latter will be treated as enemies, with the limits prescribed by the laws of war.

2. American soldiers who may be captured by the Philippine forces will be treated as prisoners of war.

3. This proclamation shall be communicated to the accredited consuls of Manila, and to congress, in order that it may accord the suspension of the constitutional guaranties and the resulting declaration of war.

Given at Malolos, February 4, 1899.

EMILIO AGUINALDO,
General-in-Chief.

These are not the words of a man taken by surprise, but a carefully prepared utterance to meet an anticipated event. In the

presence of such facts as these, and of the unbroken testimony of the officers of the Army and Navy and of our commission, that Aguinaldo began to manifest hostility to us even before Manila fell, how worse than idle it is to insist that we began a war which he and his counselors had been plotting and which, heedless of the dictates of gratitude and conscience, they brought down upon their own head.

It is not necessary to follow in detail the events of the war which thus began on February 4, 1899. The insurgents, repulsed with heavy loss in their attack on Manila, were afterwards forced back from the immediate neighborhood of the city. An expedition under General MacArthur captured Malolos, which Aguinaldo had selected as his capital, and various other expeditions were equally successful; but we had not enough troops to hold and garrison the points thus taken. A large force was required in Manila, our army was small, it was necessary to send home the volunteers and replace them by regular regiments, while the rainy season made all military operations for a time impracticable. General Otis, therefore, contented himself with holding Manila and its immediate neighborhood, and with carrying through the return of one army to the United States and the organization of a new one which was sent out. All this difficult and trying work was successfully accomplished. The various insurgent attempts to burn the city, and thus create panic and disturbance, were successfully repressed. The insurgents were held at a safe distance, and when the dry season came again the old army had gone, the new army had come, and we were able to take the field effectively.

Since that time northern Luzon has been cleared and its ports opened. The same work has been nearly, if not quite, accomplished in southern Luzon. The insurgent forces have been scattered, the insurgent government has been broken up, and nothing now remains but guerrilla fighting and brigandage. Aguinaldo, the titular head of the insurrection, after some weeks of rapid flight, is in hiding. He appears to have no love of a stricken field, does not seem ever to have led a column into battle, and apparently prefers to let others do his fighting for him. His cabinet, or advisers, are nearly all military prisoners. There is no longer any semblance of a government there to be recognized. The government which Aguinaldo personally established, and which some people in this country were so anxious to recognize, has ceased to exist. There never was anything really to be recognized except Aguinaldo himself and the adventurers who surrounded him, and now his counselors are in prison and he can not be found. He, with his government concealed about his person, is lost somewhere in the jungle.

But although Aguinaldo and his government have melted away, there are some facts in regard to him and his followers which should be noted, because they throw light upon the leader himself and his purposes, and disclose at once the utter absence of any ground for recognition and at the same time the most conclusive reasons against it. Aguinaldo himself is what is known in the islands as a Chinese Mestizo. In his first cabinet he had some representatives of the Spanish Mestizos, but they are not energetic and are naturally a quiet people, who were opposed to the wild scheme of independence. In his second cabinet, therefore, he got rid of them, and his advisers were almost all Chinese half-

breeds, like himself. These Chinese Mestizos are the most active, energetic, restless, and unscrupulous class in the islands. Although relatively but a very small element in the population, there are many thousands of them, and they are almost altogether in the neighborhood of Manila, where the Chinese are chiefly gathered, and the intermixture has taken place with the Tagalos because that is the tribe nearest to the capital city. It was to people of mixed blood like himself and to the Tagalos that Aguinaldo naturally made his appeal, and it was from these sources almost exclusively that he drew his followers and soldiers. The first government he set up was a pure dictatorial government, created by himself. The revolutionary government, of which he made himself president, differed from the first only in name, and the constitutional government which succeeded that was still the same, with the addition of certain forms imitated from American and European constitutions. There is no proof that any election was held which indicated in any way a general popular acceptance of this government, even by the Tagals, and it is known that many members of the congress which he assembled were appointed by Aguinaldo himself as representing outlying provinces. They were all liable to removal by him, and this gave to him absolute control of the body whose powers, in any event, were more nominal than real.[1]

He established his government by seizing on the machinery of the Spaniards, as anyone else could have done who was first in the field, and to the government organization, no matter who holds it, there is a strong tendency in the Asiatic mind to yield. Even then, with all this advantage, his actual power seems to have been confined to the ten Tagalog provinces, namely: Manila, Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Morong, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Principe, Infanta, and Zambales. It was strong in the first six and hardly existed in the last four, and even in the first six there was a very large element of opposition to Aguinaldo, composed of the best elements of the population, who realized that peace and good order were only to be found in American supremacy.[1]

Moreover in these ten provinces, divided as they were, the population is only a million and a half, which represents the full strength of the Tagal tribe, out of a total population of 8,000,000 and more. Thus it will be seen that Aguinaldo in no sense represented the inhabitants of the islands, or succeeded in establishing his dictatorial government even partially over more than one tribe and a limited area. As has been said, there never was any such thing as a "Philippine nation," and Aguinaldo never represented or had the support of more than a fraction of all the Filipinos. In the island of Luzon alone there are 21 wild tribes which had never been subdued by Spain, and which, as a body, gave no adherence to the insurgents. Some, like the Macabebes, made haste to join the Americans in order that they might fight the Tagals, who are their deadly enemies. Others, like a portion of the Cagayanes, who are fanatics desiring to restore the old fetich worship and the old paganism and for that purpose wish to destroy all foreigners, joined Aguinaldo in attacking the Americans, and on more than one occasion tried to ambush parties of American soldiers. The humane Aguinaldo did not hesitate to employ these religious fanatics in his warfare. He also sent expe-

[1] See Preliminary Report of Philippine Commission.

ditions to stir up revolts in other islands, chiefly among the Visayans, who are the largest tribe. In some cases, as in Panay, he was successful. In other cases, as in the island of Negros, he utterly failed, and at Zamboanga, in the island of Mindanao, the native leaders murdered his agent and surrendered the town and province to the *Castine*. How idle it is, in the presence of facts like these, to talk about Aguinaldo's government as representing the Filipinos. But this is not all. He met resistance in many of the towns and in many parts of Luzon. In numerous towns and villages the inhabitants yielded only through terror, dreaded his approach and that of his agents, in some cases resisting, while in very many others they welcomed the American troops as protection against the new despotism, which they hated worse than that of Spain.

"Throughout the archipelago there was trouble only at those points to which armed Tagalogs had been sent in considerable numbers."[1]

The government of Aguinaldo plundered the people under pretense of war contributions, while his officials grew rich. The administration of justice was paralyzed, and crime of all sorts was rampant. "Never in the worst days of Spanish misrule had the people been so overtaxed or so badly governed. In many provinces there was anarchy,"[1] and from all sides there came petitions to us for protection and help. Wherever we got possession of a town, like Imus or Bacoor, civil government was established and peacefully carried forward. Observe, now, the methods of war pursued by Aguinaldo's army. As our troops advanced, the insurgents drove out the inhabitants of the villages and burned their houses, to be rebuilt when we came in and when the deserted fields were once more cultivated. The inhabitants were plundered by the insurgent troops, who robbed them of jewels, clothing, and food, so that they were starving. Peaceable citizens were fired upon and women maltreated. In southern Luzon the Bicols, a large and powerful tribe, rose against their Tagal masters. Even the two naval officers who made a hurried trip through the island before hostilities with the United States had broken out said that the military power was everywhere dominant, and showed itself arbitrary and despotic.[2]

These were the methods which Aguinaldo employed toward the people of the Philippines immediately in reach of his soldiers. His performances in other directions were no better. Captain Arguelles was one of the officers sent to negotiate with us. Because he told the truth about us and our intentions he was considered too friendly to the United States, was deprived of his rank, dismissed the service, and sent to prison for twelve years, an example of the Aguinaldo conception of free speech. Here is another case. One of the most active and energetic of the insurgent chiefs was General Luna. He was so popular and strong that he was thought to be dangerous, and Aguinaldo had him assassinated, which throws some light on the conception entertained by this representative of free government as to the manner in which free government should be conducted. We may also learn something from the record of his manner of conducting war. He had organized bands in Manila for the purpose of an uprising in the city and for de-

[1] See Preliminary Report of the Philippine Commission.
[2] See Senate Doc. No. 66, first session Fifty-sixth Congress.

stroying it by fire. On the night of February 22, 1899, some 500 men entered that part of the city known as Tondo, started a fire, and attacked our guards. It had been planned that the local militia should join the attack. All the whites were to have been massacred. This attempt was crushed by General Hughes, and was not repeated. Nevertheless incendiary fires occurred daily, and all Filipinos favoring the Americans feared assassination.[1] At a very recent date they had a plan to throw dynamite bombs into the funeral procession of General Lawton, thus causing an uprising in the city, but this failed, for at that period the time had entirely passed when such a proceeding was possible. One more example of the character of this government and I have done. On February 15, 1899, Aguinaldo's secretary of the interior, who was also a member of his staff, issued a proclamation calling on the Filipinos in Manila and elsewhere to join in the massacre of every foreigner. I give the exact words of this precious document:

First. You will so dispose that at 8 o'clock at night the individuals of the territorial militia at your order will be found united in all the streets of San Pedro armed with their "bolos" and revolvers and guns and ammunition, if convenient.

Second. Philippine familes only will be respected. They should not be molested, but all other individuals, of whatever race they may be, will be exterminated without any compassion after the extermination of the army of occupation.

Third. The defenders of the Philippines in your command will attack the guard at Bilibid and liberate the prisoners and "presidiarios," and, having accomplished this, they will be armed, saying to them, "Brothers, we must avenge ourselves on the Americans and exterminate them, that we may take our revenge for the infamies and treacheries which they have committed upon us. Have no compassion upon them; attack with vigor. All Filipinos 'en masse' will second you. Long live Filipino independence!"

* * * * * * *

Fifth. The order which will be followed in the attack will be as follows: The sharpshooters of Tondo and Santa Ana will begin the attack from without, and these shots will be the signal for the militia of Trozo, Binondo, Quiapo, and Sampaloc to go out into the street and do their duty. Those of Paco, Ermita and Malate, Santa Cruz and San Miguel will not start out until 12 o'clock unless they see their companions need assistance.

Sixth. The militia will start out at 3 o'clock in the morning. If all do their duty our revenge will be complete. Brothers, Europe contemplates us. We know how to die as men, shedding our blood in defense of the liberty of our country. Death to the tryants; war without quarter to the false Americans, who have deceived us! Either independence or death![2]

Thus we see that under Aguinaldo's government, which represented only the leaders who set it up, and never had the support of anything but a very small proportion of the Filipino population, warfare of the most barbarous sort was carried on, and every kind of crime was committed, not only against every open enemy, but against helpless prisoners, and against the inhabitants of the islands, of whose freedom they were loudly proclaiming themselves the champions for the benefit of their sympathizers in the United States. We have no need to say that if we had left the Filipinos alone anarchy would have come. Anarchy came, and existed in full force wherever Aguinaldo held sway, coupled with bloodshed, pillage, and corruption.

Such were the men to whom it is seriously proposed that we should intrust the control of all the other millions of human beings, some half civilized, some wholly wild, who live in these other islands. Such is the government, stained with assassination, with the burning and pillage of the villages of their own people,

[1] See Preliminary Report of the Philippine Commission.
[2] Report of Major-General Otis, p. 95.

with plans for the massacre of all foreigners, and for murder and looting in Manila, cruel, arbitrary, despotic, treacherous; such, I say, is the government which we are gravely asked to assist in forcing upon the innocent population of those islands, and are denounced because we have not done so. To have recognized Aguinaldo's government and helped him to thrust it upon the other natives, or to have drawn aside and allowed him to try to wade "through slaughter to a throne" by himself would have been a crime against humanity. Those who have urged, or who now urge, such a policy should study with care and with thoroughness the government of Aguinaldo. They never do so. They never take the trouble to learn the facts about the despotism which Aguinaldo and his friends tried to set up. They laugh at facts, deride all who are in a position to bear witness, sneer at history and experience, and declaim against the Government for not giving recognition and support to something which never existed, which is the mere creature of their fancy.

How different their attitude when they come to considering the actions of their own countrymen. Men who will take the lightest word of a half-bred adventurer, of whose existence they had never heard two years ago, impugn the actions and doubt the statements of the highest officers of our Government, of the commanders of our fleets and armies, of men who have gone in and out before the American people for years, and whose courage, patriotism, and honor have never been questioned or assailed. It must be a weak and bad cause indeed which rests its support upon accusations of falsehood and prevarication directed against the President and his advisers, and against the gallant and honorable men who wear our uniform and lead our army and our navy in the day of battle. The opponents of our policy have searched the record for every careless word; they have thrown themselves eagerly on every idle rumor; they have twisted facts; they have imputed the worst motives to men who have proved their devotion to their country on the field of battle and in every department of civil life. Let us be just at least to our own. I ask no more. Take the evidence of all men who have been in those islands and whose knowledge and experience entitle them to speak, take the official record from day to day since the Spanish war began, examine the report of your commissioners, your men of science, your army and navy officers, read the utterances and the proclamations of the insurgent leader, weigh, sift, discuss. Then face the facts, all the facts, and set down naught in malice. If this is done there can be but one result. The government of Aguinaldo will stand out as I have described it, for there is no escape from the evidence. Turn to the other side and you will find not that in a situation of great difficulty and delicacy there were no mistakes, but great cause for wonder that so few were made. You will find that our Admiral and our generals never swerved from the line laid down; that they made no false promises; that they carried patience and forbearance to such a point that it encouraged men of Asiatic mind to think us weak and timid, fit subjects for attack. You will find that they saved the great city from fire and sword; that they curbed the insurgents; that they dealt with them justly; that they grasped at every chance for peace, only to find that each proposition was a sham, with neither substance nor honesty in any negotiation offered. You will also find that when war was forced upon them, so soon as they had

troops and opportunity they pushed it rapidly, effectively, and with the skill and gallantry characteristic of American soldiers to a successful conclusion.

Behind all this lies the policy of the President, which our officers followed by sea and land. History will say that it has been firm, consistent, and humane from the beginning. No false hopes were held out. From the dispatch of May 26 onward the attitude of our Government was clear and unmistakable. But every real hope, every proper promise, was freely offered and never violated. There are many duties imposed upon a President in which it is easy to imagine a personal or selfish motive, in which such motives might exist even if they do not. But here even the most malignant must be at a loss to find the existence of a bad motive possible. Suddenly at the end of the Spanish war we were confronted with the question of what should be done with the Philippines. Their fate was in our hands. We were all able to discuss them and to speculate as to what that fate should be. No responsibility rested upon us. But one man had to act. While the rest of the world was talking he had to be doing. The iron hand of necessity was upon his shoulder, and upon his alone. Act he must. No man in that high office seeks new burdens and fresh responsibilities or longs to enter on new policies with the unforeseen dangers which lie thick along untried paths. Every selfish motive, every personal interest, cried out against it. Every selfish motive, every personal interest, urged the President to let the Philippines go, and, like Gallio, to care for none of these things. It was so easy to pass by on the other side. But he faced the new conditions which surged up around him. When others then knew little he knew much. Thus he came to see what duty demanded, duty to ourselves and to others. Thus he came to see what the interests of the American people required. Guided by this sense of duty, by the spirit of the American people in the past, by a wise statesmanship, which looked deeply into the future, he boldly took the islands. Since this great decision his policy has been firm and consistent. He has sought only what was best for the people of those islands and for his own people. It is all there in the record. Yet although he fought in his youth for liberty and union, he is now coarsely accused of infatuation for a vulgar Cæsarism. He who is known to everybody as one of the kindest of men, eager to do kindly acts to everyone, is denounced as brutal and inhuman to a distant race whom he has sought in every way to benefit. When every selfish interest drew him in the other direction he has been charged with self-seeking for following the hard and thorny path of duty.

I hesitate, Mr. President, in saying even as much as I have said. The President of the United States needs no defense at my hands. His own policy and his own acts in the East are his all-sufficient defense, both now and in history. But I have read and heard with amazement and regret the attacks which have been made upon the President in connection with the Philippines. I am well aware that malignity can not raise imbecility above contempt. I know that only weak minds and bad tempers mistake abuse for argument. I am sure that it is needless to repel attacks from such sources. But, none the less, as one who has followed and studied all the details of his Eastern policy. I wish to make public record of my admiration for that policy and of my belief in it. As an American I believe it to be at once courageous, wise, and patri-

otic. The words of criticism or of praise which we utter here will pass with the hour of speech, but the great facts of the last two years will stand. In the long process of the patient years those who now assail the President with epithet and imputation will shrink down beyond the ken of even the antiquarian's microscope; but the name of the President who took the Philippines and planted our flag at the portals of the East will stand out bright and clear upon the pages of history, where all men may read it, and he will have a monument better than any reared by human hands in fair and fertile islands blooming after long neglect and in a race redeemed from tyranny and lifted up to broadening freedom and to larger hopes. [Applause in the galleries.]

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. No applause is permitted in the galleries, and, if it is repeated at any time, the galleries will be cleared.

Mr. LODGE. I come now to a consideration of the advantages to the United States involved in our acquisition and retention of the Philippine Islands, although I can not hope in this respect to add to the eloquent statement made from personal knowledge by the Senator from Indiana. When these arguments are offered in behalf of our Philippine policy the opponents of that policy stigmatize them as sordid. I have never been able to see why they were any more sordid than arguments of exactly the same character urged against the retention of the islands, but we may let that inconsistency pass as one of the familiar incidents of political discussion. I do not myself consider them sordid, for anything which involves the material interests and the general welfare of the people of the United States seems to me of the highest merit and the greatest importance. Whatever duty to others might seem to demand, I should pause long before supporting any policy if there were the slightest suspicion that it was not for the benefit of the people of the United States. I conceive my first duty to be always to the American people, and I have ever considered it the cardinal principle of American statesmanship to advocate policies which would operate for the benefit of the people of the United States, and most particularly for the advantage of our farmers and our workmen, upon whose well-being, and upon whose full employment at the highest wages, our entire fabric of society and government rests. In a policy which gives us a foothold in the East, which will open a new market in the Philippines, and enable us to increase our commerce with China, I see great advantages to all our people, and more especially to our farmers and our workingmen.

The disadvantages which are put forward seem to me unreal or at best trivial. Dark pictures are drawn of the enormously increased expense of the Navy and of the Army which will be necessitated by these new possessions. So far as the Navy goes, our present fleet is now entirely inadequate for our own needs. We require many more ships and many more men for the sure defense of the United States against foreign aggression, and our guarantee of peace rests primarily upon our Navy. Neither the possession nor the abandonment of the Philippines would have the slightest effect upon the size of the Navy of the United States. If, as I hope, we shall build up a Navy adequate to our needs, we shall have an abundant force to take care of the Philippines and find employment there in times of peace without the addition of a man or a gun on account of our ownership of those islands.

The Philippines will entail upon us no naval expenses that we should not have in any event with a proper naval establishment. But the great bugbear is the army. Enormous sums have been stated here, all of them mere guesswork, to represent the increased expense to which we have been put by the call for troops for the Philippines. Although these statements are exaggerated, there can be no question that our military expenditure during the past year has been increased by the Philippines, because there has been a war going on in those islands which demanded a large body of troops. But that war is practically over. There is no reason to doubt that in a comparatively short time peace and order will be restored, and when we are considering what burden the possession of the islands will impose upon us we must proceed upon the normal conditions of peace. If we should employ in the Philippines as many American troops, proportionately, as England employs in British India, we should keep there an army of 2,500 to 3,000 men, but the fact that the Philippines are composed of scattered islands would undoubtedly necessitate the employment of a larger body than this. Spain found less than 15,000 men sufficient, and I think it is safe to say that if Spain was able to manage with 15,000 men, the same number of American soldiers would be enough to do very well what Spain did very badly. As to the expense involved, it seems to be entirely forgotten that the islands themselves are abundantly able to pay for the establishment there, both civil and military. Under Spanish rule, with all its bad administration and profound corruption the islands not only paid all their expenses, but made at times at least a return to the Spanish treasury. With revenues well and honestly administered, and with wise and honest expenditure, the islands in our hands would not only easily pay all the expenses of the military establishment, but of the civil government as well, and we could at the same time, by our superior honesty and efficiency, greatly lighten the burden of taxation. In a word, the Philippine Islands, as we should govern and administer them, would be entirely self-supporting, and would throw no burden of expense at all on the people of the United States after peace and order were once restored and business was again flowing in its normal channels.

We are also told that the possession of these islands brings a great responsibility upon us. This, Mr. President, I freely admit. A great nation must have great responsibilities. It is one of the penalties of greatness. But the benefit of responsibilities goes hand in hand with the burdens they bring. The nation which seeks to escape from the burden also loses the benefit, and if it cowers in the presence of a new task and shirks a new responsibility the period of its decline is approaching. That fatal hour may draw near on leaden feet, but weakness and timidity are sure signs that it is coming, be its progress swift or slow. These islands, I well know, impose upon us new and great responsibilities, and I do not doubt that we shall make mistakes in dealing with them before we reach complete success, but I firmly believe that they will enure to our lasting benefit. The athlete does not win his race by sitting habitually in an armchair. The pioneer does not open up new regions to his fellowmen by staying in warm shelter behind the city walls. A cloistered virtue is but a poor virtue after all. Men who have done great things are those who have never shrunk from trial or adventure. If a man has the right qualities in him, responsibility sobers, strengthens, and

develops him. The same is true of nations. The nation which fearlessly meets its responsibilities rises to the task when the pressure is upon it. I believe that these new possessions and these new questions, this necessity for watching over the welfare of another people, will improve our civil service, raise the tone of public life, and make broader and better all our politics and the subjects of political discussion. My faith in the American people is such that I have no misgiving as to their power to meet these responsibilities and to come out stronger and better for the test, doing full justice to others as well as to themselves.

So much for the objections commonly made to our Philippine policy, which have as little foundation, in my opinion, as those which proceed on the theory that we are engaged in the perpetration of a great wrong. Let us now look at the other side, and there, I believe, we shall find arguments in favor of the retention of the Philippines as possessions of great value and a source of great profit to the people of the United States which can not be overthrown. First, as to the islands themselves. They are over a hundred thousand square miles in extent, and are of the greatest richness and fertility. From these islands comes now the best hemp in the world, and there is no tropical product which can not be raised there in abundance. Their forests are untouched, of great extent, and with a variety of hard woods of almost unexampled value. Gold is found throughout all the islands, but not in large quantities, and there is no indication that the production of gold could ever reach a very great amount. There appears to be little or no silver. There are regions in Luzon containing great and valuable deposits of copper which have never been developed. But the chief mineral value of the islands is in their undeveloped coal beds, which are known to exist in certain parts and are believed to exist everywhere, and which are certainly very extensive and rich. The coal is said to be lignite, and, although 20 to 30 per cent inferior to our coals or to those of Cardiff, is practically as good as the Australian coal and better than that of Japan, both of which are largely used in the East to-day. To a naval and commercial power the coal measures of the Philippines will be a source of great strength and of equally great value. It is sufficient for me to indicate these few elements of natural wealth in the islands which only await development.

A much more important point is to be found in the markets which they furnish. The total value of exports and imports for 1896 amounted in round numbers to $29,000,000, and this was below the average. The exports were nearly $20,000,000, the imports a little over $9,000,000. We took from the Philippines exports to the value of $4,308,000, next in amount to the exports to Great Britain, but the Philippine Islands took from us imports to the value of only $94,000. There can be no doubt that the islands in our peaceful possession would take from us a very large proportion of their imports. Even as the islands are to-day there is opportunity for a large absorption of products of the United States, but it must not be forgotten that the islands are entirely undeveloped. The people consume foreign imports at the rate of only a trifle more than $1 per capita. With the development of the islands and the increase of commerce and of business activity the consumption of foreign imports would rapidly advance, and of this increase we should reap the chief benefit. We shall also find great profit in the work of developing the islands. They require railroads every-

where. Those railroads would be planned by American engineers, the rails and the bridges would come from American mills, the locomotives and cars from American workshops. The same would hold true in regard to electric railways, electric lighting, telegraphs. telephones, and steamships for the local business. Some indication of what we may fairly expect may be found in the following tables of our exports to, and our imports from, our new possessions and Cuba in 1899 as compared with 1897.

United States exports.

To—	1897.	1899.
Puerto Rico	$2,023,751	$3,677,564
Cuba	9,308,515	24,861,261
Philippines	69,459	1,663,213
Hawaii	5,478,224	11,305,581
Total	16,869,949	41,507,619

United States imports.

From—	1897.	1899.
Puerto Rico	$1,943,251	$3,416,681
Cuba	16,233,456	29,619,759
Philippines	4,352,181	4,905,467
Hawaii	15,311,685	22,188,206
Total	37,840,573	60,228,113

By these figures it will be seen that our imports from the islands have increased $23,000,000 and our exports to them $25,000,000. The increase in exports is almost wholly to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii, amounting to $24,000,000 as against $1,000,000 increase to the Philippines. Yet the opportunity for export to the Philippines is larger than to all the rest put together. The fact of the insurrection in the former accounts of course for the difference, but the great increase of exports to the islands where peace reigns shows what may be expected of the Philippines when like conditions prevail there. An increase of $25,000,000 in our exports to the islands may strike some lofty minds as "sordid." To me that increase means wages and employment to a large number of American farmers and workingmen, and I therefore regard it as of the highest beneficence and importance, and as a striking justification of the policy which finds in our possession of these islands not only advantages to their inhabitants, but an expansion of trade of great profit and value to American labor and American industry. Thus is it demonstrated that we should gain in the Philippines themselves, under normal and peaceful conditions and with the growing prosperity which our control would bring, a market of very great value to the workingmen, the operatives, and the farmers of the United States.

But the value of the Philippine Islands, both natural and acquired, and as a market for our products, great as it undoubtedly is, and greater as it unquestionably will be, is trifling compared to the indirect results which will flow from our possession of them. From the time of the war between China and Japan it became apparent that great changes were impending in the

East, changes which many economists and publicists believed would play the master part in the history of the next century. The struggle for the world's trade, which has for many years been shaping ever more strongly the politics and the history of mankind, has its richest prize set before it in the vast markets of China. Every great nation has recognized the importance of this prize, either by the acquisition of Chinese territory or by obtaining certain rights and privileges through treaty. But after the war between China and Japan this movement rapidly assumed an acute form. It grew daily more apparent that Russia was closing in upon the Chinese Empire, and that her policy, at once slow and persistent, aimed at nothing less than the exclusion of other nations from the greatest market of the world. To us, with our increasing population, and an agricultural and industrial production which was advancing by leaps and bounds, the need of new markets in the very near future, if we hoped to maintain full employment and ample returns to our farmers and our workingmen, was very clear. More than ready to take our chance in a fair field against all rivals, and with full faith in the indomitable ingenuity and enterprise of our people, it was more than ever important that we should not be shut out from any market by unjust or peculiar discriminations if by any methods such a misfortune could be avoided. The great danger to our interests in China became clearer and clearer as the months went by to those who watched the progress of great economic and political forces outside our own boundaries. I do not think that there were many who did so, but I remember very well that some time before the Spanish war the senior Senator from Colorado pointed out in a public interview the importance of the Chinese question and the necessity that would soon be upon us of taking some steps in conjunction with England and Japan, and very probably with Germany and with France, in order to prevent our exclusion from that empire by the great power of the north which was closing down upon it. There were others who felt in the same way, although I do not think they were very numerous, but I am quite sure that nobody saw very clearly how we were to assert in the East our rights and interests which were so important to the welfare of our agriculture and our industry. That Hawaii was necessary as the first and essential step toward our obtaining that share to which we were entitled in the trade of the Pacific, the ocean of the future, was obvious enough, but beyond that all was doubt and darkness. Then came the Spanish war, and the smoke of Dewey's guns had hardly cleared away when it was seen by those who were watching that he had not only destroyed the Spanish fleet, but had given to his countrymen the means of solving their problem in the far East. He had made us an Eastern power. He had given us not only the right to speak, but the place to speak from.

Let me now try to show the importance and meaning of the Eastern question, with regard to which Dewey's victory has given us such a commanding position. The Empire of China has a population of which we have no accurate statistics, but which is certainly over four hundred millions. The rate of consumption among the Chinese per capita is at present low, but even as it stands it affords a great market for foreign imports. The work of opening up the country by railroads and of developing its still untouched natural resources has begun and is advancing with giant strides. There is the greatest opportunity in China

for trade expansion which exists anywhere in the world. I desire to call the attention of the Senate to the value of the Chinese trade to us now despite our neglect of it, and to the enormous advance which that trade has made in the last four years, and more especially since the Spanish war carried our flag into the East and turned the attention of our people more sharply to the unlimited opportunites for commerce which there exist.

In our commerce with China during 1889–1899 there was a gain of $13,293,168. The increase occurred almost entirely in the export trade, which advanced from $2,791,128 in 1889 to $14,493,440 in 1899. Our imports for 1899, amounting to $18,619,268, were only slightly larger than in 1889, when a value of $17,028,412 was reported. The exports to China, like those to Japan, showed an exceptional growth in 1897, 1898, and 1899, the records for these years being $11,924,433, $9,992,894, and $14,493,440, respectively. Our trade with the port of Hongkong, although less important than that credited directly with China, was nearly doubled during 1898–1899, making a gain of $5,045,149. The exports for 1899 had a value of $7,732,525 as compared with only $3,686,384 for 1889. The imports were considerably smaller and showed marked fluctuations. In 1889 they were valued at $1,480,266, but these figures were not equaled again until 1899, when a value of $2,479,274 was recorded. From these figures it will be seen that our exports to China and Hongkong in 1899 were over $22,000,000, and that the growth in the last three years had been phenomenal. The gain in exports to China, Hongkong, and Japan in 1899 over 1889 was 256 per cent, and it almost all came in the last years of the decade.

I will not take the time of the Senate in analyzing these figures and showing the different articles of export which make up these totals. That has all been most admirably done in the bulletin of the Department of Agriculture prepared by Mr. Hitchcock upon our trade with China, Japan, and Hongkong. I have not touched upon our trade with Japan at all, but I would strongly recommend a study of this bulletin, which shows how much our possession of the Philippines and our increased interests in the East have stimulated our trade with that country. There are two points, however, to which I wish to call especial attention, because they emphasize and demonstrate the great value to our farming and manufacturing interests of this vast Chinese market into which we are just entering. In 1898 we sent nearly four million dollars' worth of wheat flour to Hongkong alone, while to China we sent $5,203,427 worth of cotton manufactures in the same year and over $9,000,000 worth, as compared with only $2,854,221 worth for 1894. These are illustrations in two leading articles of what the Chinese market means to the Western growers of wheat and to the manufacturers of cotton. Nearly all these cotton manufactures came from the South, and have been to our Southern mills a source of great profit, while at the same time they have relieved the pressure upon the domestic market and are thus a direct benefit to every cotton factory in New England or in any other part of the country. Ex pede Herculem! From these two items as well as from the long lists of Mr. Hitchcock we can judge what the trade of China is to us to-day and what it is destined to be. The loss of that market and of its prospects and possibilities I should regard as one of the greatest calamities which could befall the farmers and the workingmen of the United States.

How, then, are we to hold and develop it? Look at your tables of statistics and note the increases which have occurred since the capture of Manila. The mere fact that we hold the Philippine Islands increases our trade with all the East—with China and Japan alike. Trade certainly has followed the flag, and its appearance at Manila has been the signal for this marked growth in our commerce with the neighboring States and Empires.

But we must go a step further. Having this opportunity to obtain a large and increasing share in the trade of China, how shall we make sure that it is not taken from us? We know well that China is threatened by Russia, and that Russian dominion, if unrestrained, would mean discrimination and exclusion in the Chinese markets. Sooner than anyone dreamed it has been shown how far the Philippines have solved this pressing problem for us. The possession of the Philippines made us an Eastern power, with the right and, what was equally important, the force behind the right to speak. Mr. Hay, as Secretary of State, has obtained from all the great powers of Europe their assent to our demand for the guaranty of all our treaty rights in China and for the maintenance of the policy of the open door. I do not belittle one of the most important and most brilliant diplomatic achievements in our hundred years of national existence when I say that the assent of these other powers to the propositions of the United States was given to the master of Manila. They might have turned us aside three years ago with a shrug and a smile, but to the power which held Manila Bay, and whose fleet floated upon its waters, they were obliged to give a gracious answer. Manila, with its magnificent bay, is the prize and the pearl of the East. In our hands it will become one of the greatest distributing points, one of the richest emporiums of the world's commerce. Rich in itself, with all its fertile islands behind it, it will keep open to us the markets of China and enable American enterprise and intelligence to take a master share in all the trade of the Orient. We have been told that arguments like these are sordid. Sordid indeed! Then what arguments are worthy of consideration? A policy which proposes to open wider markets to the people of the United States, to add to their employment, and to increase their wages, and which in its pursuit requires that we should save the teeming millions of China from the darkness of the Russian winter, and keep them free, not merely for the incoming of commerce, but for the entrance of the light of western civilization, seems to me a great and noble policy, if there ever was such, and one which may well engage the best aspirations and the highest abilities of American statesmanship.

Thus, Mr. President, I have shown that duty and interest alike, duty of the highest kind and interest of the highest and best kind, impose upon us the retention of the Philippines, the development of the islands, and the expansion of our Eastern commerce. All these things, in my belief, will come to pass, whatever the divisions of the present moment, for no people who have come under our flag have ever sought to leave it, and there is no territory which we have acquired that any one would dream of giving up. All our vast growth and expansion have been due to the spirit of our race, and have been guided by the instinct of the American people, which in all great crises has proved wiser than any reasoning. This mighty movement westward, building up a nation and conquering a continent as it swept along, has not been the work

of chance or accident. It was neither chance nor accident which brought us to the Pacific and which has now carried us across the great ocean even to the shores of Asia, to the very edge of the cradle of the Aryans, whence our far distant ancestors started on the march which has since girdled the world.

Call up your own history as witness. It was not inevitable that we should take Louisiana. We could have remained shut up between the Mississippi and the Atlantic and allowed another people to build the great city where New Orleans stands. But it was inevitable, if we followed the true laws of our being, that we should be masters of the Mississippi and spread from its mouth to its source. It was not inevitable that the union of States should endure. Had we so chosen we could have abandoned it, but if we had abandoned it we should have gone down to nothingness, a disintegrated chaos of petty republics. We determined that the Union should live, and then it was inevitable that it should come to what it is to-day. There was nothing inevitable about the Monroe Doctrine. We need never have asserted it, need never have maintained it. Had we failed to do both we should have had Europe established all about us; we should have been forced to become a nation of great standing armies; our growth and power would have been choked and stifled. But we have declared and upheld it. We have insisted that all the world should heed it, and it is one of the signs of the times that in The Hague Convention we have obtained at last a formal recognition of it from all the nations of Europe. Yet the Monroe Doctrine is far more than a proposition of international law which we have laid down. Millions of men are ready to fight for that doctrine who could not define its terms, and who have never read, perhaps, the famous message which announced it. That is because the instinct of the people recognizes in that doctrine a great principle of national life. Without clinging to it we should be in constant peril, our evolution would be retarded, our existence menaced. The European power which attempts to establish itself in new possessions in the Americas, whether on a little island or in a continental state, from Patagonia to the Rio Grande, is our enemy. We are ready to fight upon that "theme until our eyelids do no longer wag." Is it because we want territory to the south of us? Far from it. It is because we know by instinct that it is a law of our being, a principle of our national life, that no power from over seas shall come into this hemisphere to thwart our policy or to cross our path. The Monroe doctrine, with all it implies, is inevitable if we are to be true to the laws of our being.

Like every great nation, we have come more than once in our history to where the road of fate divided. Thus far we have never failed to take the right path. Again are we come to the parting of the ways. Again a momentous choice is offered to us. Shall we hesitate and make, in coward fashion, what Dante calls "the great refusal?" Even now we can abandon the Monroe doctrine, we can reject the Pacific, we can shut ourselves up between our oceans, as Switzerland is inclosed among her hills, and then it would be inevitable that we should sink out from among the great powers of the world and heap up riches that some stronger and bolder people, who do not fear their fate, might gather them. Or we may follow the true laws of our being, the laws in obedience to which we have come to be what we are, and then we shall stretch out into the Pacific; we shall stand in the front rank of the world

powers; we shall give to our labor and our industry new and larger and better opportunities; we shall prosper ourselves; we shall benefit mankind. What we have done was inevitable because it was in accordance with the laws of our being as a nation, in the defiance and disregard of which lie ruin and retreat.

I know well the objections which are made to this theory of national life. I have heard much criticism upon the word "inevitable" as applied to our movement into the far East. Still more censure has been directed against our familiar phrase of "manifest destiny." It has been intimated that it is the tyrant's and the robber's plea, the coward's excuse, and the hypocrite's pretense to say that these events which have taken place since 1898 were inevitable. Such criticism proceeds on what seems to me a total misconception. I should be the last to deny the doctrine of free will, but I believe most profoundly that when certain conditions are given, certain results are sure to come. I believe this because I believe in the reign of law. We stand like children on the seashore, knowing only the shells and the pebbles where we tread, understanding only the ripple of the waves breaking at our feet, while far away before us stretches the great ocean of knowledge, whose confines we can not see, and whose possessions we can only dimly guess. We catalogued the visible stars and then photographed the heavens, only to find far beyond the bodies which the most powerful telescopes can disclose myriads of stars and systems glimmering away into infinite space. What they are, what other worlds than ours there may be we do not know, but we have learned that they move in obedience to law. When sci ence demonstrates its theories it tells us little more than that—

> The spangled heavens a shining frame,
> Their great original proclaim.

The doctrine of the old theologians and schoolmen that the universe was all made for man is no more vain and arrogant than the assertion that man is too insignificant to find place in the great system of universal law. The same laws which govern the movements of the uncounted stars in space, tint the wings of the moth so that his keen-eyed enemy can not distinguish him from the dead leaf or the roughened bark, and paint the little sand spider so cunningly that unless he move his most virulent pursurer would not know that he was not part of the glittering grains among which he hides. If we assume a system capable of regulating the stars in their courses, it must be one equally able to color the moth or hide the spider. There must be a power which grasps the infinitely little as well as the infinitely great, for any other would be limited and finite. If we say with reverence, as the greatest of poets said, that we are in the care of Him "who doth the ravens feed; yea, providently caters for the sparrow," are we to suppose that nations alone are not subject to law? Are we to believe it possible that the races of men go stumbling blindly through the centuries, the playthings of chance, the helpless victims of their own passions?

Science has revealed the immense antiquity of man, and has demonstrated that through eons of time the race has been migrating hither and thither, shifting and changing, developing civilizations which have perished off the face of the earth, leaving only dumb symbols carved on stone, or hardened bones which the rock alone preserves. Yet were they always moving, these

long-vanished people, always striving, always rising up or sinking down in obedience to unknown, inexorable laws which governed alike their growth and their decay. There was a process of evolution governed by law, which ruled them and their fate; that is all we know.

Then history takes up the wondrous tale and the whole effort of modern research is in the passionate demand that she reveal to us the laws which have ruled in the short period over which she holds sway. That there were laws we know, and very slowly, very dimly, we are beginning to discern what they were. We detect them in the migrations of tribes and races; we can see their operations in the rise and fall of nations and empires. One people fades out of existence, another grows, and climbs, and inherits the earth. Very far removed as it is from an exact science, history still teaches clearly enough that the evolution of nations depends upon laws of their being, which, if obeyed, lead in one direction, if disobeyed are replaced by others which will carry the disobedient to a widely different fate. I believe, therefore, that men and nations are like all else in the universe the subjects of law; that if they obey the laws of their being and follow them rightly they will succeed; that if they violate these laws they fall the victims of others equally powerful and go down to failure and dishonor.

I do not believe that this nation was raised up for nothing. I do not believe that it is the creation of blind chance. I have faith that it has a great mission in the world—a mission of good, a mission of freedom. I believe that it can live up to that mission; therefore I want to see it step forward boldly and take its place at the head of the nations. I wish to see it master of the Pacific. I would have it fulfill what I think is its manifest destiny if it is not false to the laws which govern it. I am not dreaming of a primrose path. I know well that in the past we have committed grievous mistakes and paid for them, done wrong and made heavy compensation for it, stumbled and fallen and suffered. But we have always risen, bruised and grimed sometimes, yet still we have risen stronger and more erect than ever, and the march has always been forward and onward. Onward and forward it will still be, despite stumblings and mistakes as before, while we are true to ourselves and obedient to the laws which have ruled our past and will still govern our future. But when we begin to distrust ourselves, to shrink from our own greatness, to shiver before the responsibilities which come to us, to retreat in the face of doubts and difficulties, then indeed peril will be near at hand. I would have our great nation always able to say:

> It matters not how strait the gate,
> How charged with punishments the scroll,
> I am the master of my fate,
> I am the captain of my soul.

I have unbounded faith and pride in my country. I am proud of her past, and in that past I read her future. I do not read it in any vain or boastful temper, but with a spirit of reverence and gratitude for all that has gone, and with a very humble prayer that we may make the present and future worthy of the past, and that, in the old Latin words—

Sicut patribus sit Deus nobis.

APPENDIX.

A.

Section 2 of an act approved October 31, 1803, to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April, 1803, and for the temporary government thereof:

SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted*, That until the expiration of the present session of Congress, unless provision for the temporary government of said territories be sooner made by Congress, all the military, civil, and judicial powers exercised by the officers of the existing government of the same shall be vested in such person and persons, aud shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of Louisiana in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion.

B.

Part of section 2, of an act approved March 3, 1819, to authorize the President of the United States to take possession of East and West Florida, and establish a temporary government therein:

SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted*, That until the end of the first session of the next Congress, unless provision for the temporary government of said territories be sooner made by Congress, all the military, civil, and judicial powers exercised by the officers of the existing government of the same territories, shall be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct, for the maintaining the inhabitants of said territories in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion.

C.

Paragraph 3 of an act approved July 7, 1898, to provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States:

The existing laws of the United States relative to public lands shall not apply to such lands in the Hawaiian Islands; but the Congress of the United States shall enact special laws for their management and disposition: *Provided*, That all revenue from or proceeds of the same, except as regards such part thereof as may be used or occupied for the civil, military, or naval purposes of the United States, or may be assigned for the use of the local government, shall be used solely for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for educational and other public purposes.

D.

The following two cablegrams from Major-General Otis and letter from General Lawton are on file at the War Department in regard to the assassination of General Luna:

MANILA, *June 13, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Washington:

It is believed that the killing of Lieutenant-General Luna on the 8th instant, near San Isidro, by Aguinaldo's guard, will be attended with important results not derogatory to United States interests.

OTIS.

MANILA, *June 14, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Washington:

General Luna, killed 8th instant at Aguinaldo's headquarters, held supreme military command, was uncompromising for continuation of war, influenced lower and robber classes, demanded confinement or death of all who should advise peace, and greatly feared by natives in country occupied by his troops on account of cruelties practiced. He dominated Aguinaldo and all insurgent officers, civil and military. His death received with satisfaction by all influential Philippines.

OTIS.

Also the following, from Lawton to MacArthur. May 18, which doubtless explains the occasion for the assassination:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, San Isidro, May 18, 1899.

GENERAL MACARTHUR, *San Fernando:*

Four commissioners, headed by Gen. Gregorio del Pilar, will go under escort to-morrow, via Malolos, to see General Otis, and commission, from what I can understand, will not have definite results. From inquiry with one of its members, one of my staff officers reports that the former commission named by Aguinaldo to treat for peace has been dissolved by Luna. The latter arrested Buencamino and Arguellas in Cabanatuan, and has sent them to Talavera. Luna, it appears, desires to be dictator; has the greater part of the army (five or six thousand) under his influence. Aguinaldo fears Luna and is but nominally in power. Present commission bears no more power than to request suspension of hostilities for short time to call congressional assembly for further action. This proposition from General Luna. Again, one of the commission reports that previous to the capture of Calumpit, Aguinaldo had given Pio del Pilar orders to move from Antipolo to the assistance of Gregorio del Pilar at Baliuag. Pio did not comply with the order, deeming it inadvisable. Now, it is said, Pio is on the road with 1,000 men to invade towns in the province of Bulucan.

LAWTON,
Major-General Volunteers.

E.

TABLES SHOWING OUR IMPORT AND EXPORT TRADE WITH CHINA AND HONGKONG DURING EACH FISCAL YEAR FROM 1889 TO 1899.

Following is a statement of the imports and exports in our direct trade with China during each fiscal year from 1889 to 1899, inclusive:

Value of merchandise imported and exported by the United States in the trade with China during each fiscal year from 1889 to 1899, inclusive.

Years ended June 30—	Imports.			Exports.			Total imports and exports.	Excess of imports over exports.
	Free.	Dutiable.	Total.	Domestic merchandise.	Foreign merchandise.	Total.		
	Dollars.	*Dollars.*	*Dollars.*	*Dollars.*	*Dollars.*	*Dollars.*	*Dollars.*	*Dollars.*
1889	11,583,611	5,444,801	17,028,412	2,790,621	507	2,791,128	19,819,540	14,237,284
1890	11,332,805	4,927,666	16,260,471	2,943,790	2,419	2,946,209	19,206,680	13,314,262
1891	14,577,887	4,743,963	19,321,850	8,700,308	700	8,701,008	28,022,858	10,620,842
1892	15,936,431	4,551,860	20,488,291	5,663,471	26	5,663,497	26,151,788	14,824,794
1893	15,469,945	5,166,590	20,636,535	3,900,457		3,900,457	24,536,992	16,736,078
Annual average 1889–1893	13,780,136	4,966,976	18,747,112	4,799,730	730	4,800,460	23,547,572	13,946,652
1894	13,348,786	3,786,242	17,135,028	5,858,488	3,938	5,862,426	22,997,454	11,272,602
1895	16,958,428	3,587,401	20,545,829	3,602,741	1,099	3,603,840	24,149,669	16,941,989
1896	18,195,233	3,827,771	22,023,004	6,921,136	797	6,921,933	28,944,937	15,101,071
1897	17,288,264	3,115,598	20,403,862	11,916,888	7,545	11,924,433	32,328,295	8,479,429
1898	15,120,790	5,205,646	20,326,436	9,992,070	824	9,992,894	30,319,330	10,333,542
Annual average 1894–1898	16,182,300	3,904,532	20,086,832	7,658,265	2,840	7,661,105	27,747,937	12,425,727
1899			18,619,268			14,493,440	33,112,708	4,125,828

The following statistics show the annual value of our import and export trade with Hongkong during the fiscal years 1889-1899:

Value of merchandise imported and exported by the United States in the trade with Hongkong during each fiscal year from 1889 to 1899, inclusive.

Years ended June 30—	Imports.			Exports.			Total imports and exports.	Excess of exports over imports.
	Free.	Dutiable.	Total.	Domestic merchandise.	Foreign merchandise.	Total.		
	Dollars.	*Dollars.*	*Dollars.*	*Dollars.*	*Dollars.*	*Dollars.*	*Dollars.*	*Dollars.*
1889	513,108	967,158	1,480,266	3,675,594	10,790	3,686,384	5,166,650	2,206,118
1890	290,059	679,686	969,745	4,434,641	4,512	4,439,153	5,408,898	3,469,408
1891	270,615	292,660	563,275	4,743,498	25,199	4,768,697	5,331,972	4,205,422
1892	376,483	386,840	763,323	4,887,350	6,699	4,894,049	5,657,372	4,130,726
1893	372,696	505,382	878,078	4,214,576	2,026	4,216,602	5,094,680	3,338,524
Annual average 1889-1893	364,592	566,345	930,937	4,391,132	9,845	4,400,977	5,331,914	3,470,040
1894	253,289	639,222	892,511	4,208,128	1,719	4,209,847	5,102,358	3,317,336
1895	353,546	422,930	776,476	4,244,895	8,145	4,253,040	5,029,516	3,476,564
1896	855,954	563,170	1,419,124	4,681,380	9,821	4,691,201	6,110,325	3,272,077
1897	617,537	306,305	923,842	6,052,180	7,859	6,060,039	6,983,881	5,136,197
1898	283,752	462,765	746,517	6,233,607	31,593	6,265,200	7,011,717	5,518,683
Annual average 1894-1898	472,816	478,878	951,694	5,084,038	11,827	5,095,865	6,047,559	4,144,171
1899			2,479,274			7,732,525	10,211,799	5,253,251

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