Mind and Matter, the two sub stances about which philosophy is conversant, . . .13

Importance of distinction between Matter and Mind, . . .14

Two classes of philosophers, ac cording to the predominance assigned in their systems to Matter or Mind, . . .14

Consciousness the only immediate object of cognition, . . .14

Consciousness the starting-point of philosophy, . . . .15

How the mind passes from a state of simple consciousness to the idea of self, . . . .16

Descartes' Enthymeme, . .16

The German " Ego," . . .16

The amount of Descartes' Enthy meme. Fichtc's formula, . .17

The idea of personal existence, the first, idea of the awakening mind, 18


Origin of the Idea of Externality, . 19 Dr. Brown's account of this idea, . 21 If cm arks on Dr. Brown's account

of this idea, . . . .24 Error of Dr. Brown in denying any peculiar intuition in order to this

idea, 24

Special difficulty in regard to the mode of communication between Mind and Matter, . . 27

Vanity of attempting to account for this communication, or explain the mode of it, . . . . 28 The principle of common sense, . 29 Coincidence between Reid, Oswald, and Beattie, and the French phi losopher, Father Buffier, . . 29


The Idea of Externality not that of

an external world, . . .30 Origin of the idea of matter, . 31

Muscular resistance as distinguish ed from tactual, . . .35

Dr. Brown the first to take notice of this distinction, . . .35

Matter, what, as first apprehended by the mind, . . . .35

Other properties of matter, . . 35

Idea of substance. Substance and quality distinguished, . . 35

The mind informed of its own ex istence, and its own qualities, pari passu with its informa tions respecting matter, . . 39

This indicates the laws of our being, 39


The idea of Extension, . ' . 40

What gives us this idea, . . 40

The ideas of magnitude and figure, 41 How the infant mind is concerned in the attainment of its first or

primitive ideas, . . . . 41



Magnitude, figure, distance, not ob jects of sight, . . . . 42

Illustrations to show that these are acquired objects of vision, or con nected with vision only by a pro cess of association, . . .43


Primary Qualities of Matter, . 47

Dr. Brown's view as to the primary qualities, 47

The secondary qualities of matter, 48

Weight, or gravitation, a law ra ther than a property of matter. Weight but the action of gravi tation, . . . . .49

The centripetal and centrifugal forces the two grand and per vading agencies in the universe, 49

The secondary qualities of matter but modifications of the primary, according to Locke, . . .50

Difference in the child's process of attaining its ideas from this point forward, 50


Idea of Space, . . . .52

Locke's account of this idea, . 52

Reid's account of this idea, . . 52 What space is according to the

German metaphysicians, . . 54 What, according to Dr. Samuel

Clarke, 55

Three particulars noticed by Cousin

in connexion with this idea, . 57

Has space objectivity? . . 58

The idea of Time, . . .59 Locke's account of the idea, . . 59 Origin of the idea according to Dr.

Brown, 60

View of Cousin, . . . .61 Merit of Locke, according to Cou sin, in tracing the origin of this

idea, 63

Though the notion of time derived from succession, not itself suc cession, . . . . .64

Time absolute,

The idea of Eternity,




Idea of Power, . . . .65 Origin of the idea, . . .65 Nature of the idea, . . .67 Efficiency denied to power, . . 68 Barrow, Hobbes, Butler, and Ber keley, quoted by Dugald Stewart as denying efficiency in power, 68 The doctrine of Malebranche, . 69 Atheism of Hume in denying effi ciency to power, . . .70 Leslie's approbation of Hume's doc trine, . . . . . 7U Opposition of the General Assem bly of the Church of Scotland to Leslie's appointment to the Chair of Mathematics in the Univer sity of Edinburgh, . . .70 Brown's defence of Leslie, . . 70 Hume and Brown's views respec tively, 70

Inadmissibility of these views, . 72 The views of others, though de nying efficiency to subordinate causes, still consistent with effi ciency in the Great First Cause, 7ii The language of Barrow, Hobbes, Butler, and Berkeley, consistent with the supposition of efficiency in power, although that efficiency might not be detected, . . 73 The denial of efficiency in second ary causes, intended to lead to the Great First Cause, . . 75 Language of Scripture in reference to God as the supreme and uni versally controlling power or cause, . .'.... . .75

Dr. Reid's view, (note,) . . 76 Sir William Hamilton's remarks

upon this view, (note,) . .76 Whewell quoted, (note,) . .76 Classification of the sciences accord ing to the simple ideas traced, with the ideas of motion and

number, 77

Metaphysics a "PrimaPhilosophia," 78



Whevvell regards the simple ideas as forms of the understanding, . 78

Dr. Chalmers's stricture upon Whewell, .... 79

Remarks upon the view which makes the simple ideas forms of the understanding, . . .79


Peculiar character of the primary or fundamental ideas, . 82

Progress of the mind from this stage different from all its previous progress, 83

The part which sensation, and the part which mind, have, respec tively, iu our primitive or fun damental ideas, . . .83

Sensation, . . . . -84

The necessity ot an intellectual principle to account for the phe nomena of mind, . . .85

Sensation still the first fact or law of mind to be observed, . . 87

The question, When does sensation cease, and a purely mental state commence ? . . .88

Important to mark this, . . 88

The tendency to forget mind amid the claims of matter, . . 88

Materialism the result of too great an engrossment in mere matter, 89

A materialistic tendency by no meaus to be treated as one not possible, 91

Mind not an organic result, . . 92 Importance attached to mind, when

spoken of as the soul in Scripture, 94 Doctrine of the ancient Epicureans, 94

Classification of philosophers ac cording to a sensational or ideal istic tendency, . . . .95

Descartes and Gassendi founders of separate schools of philosophy, 96

The French metaphysicians for the most part followers of Gassendi, 9(5

Locke claimed by this school, . 96


False grounds of this claim, . . 96 Gassendi and Condillac quoted, . 97 Injustice done to Locke ; his real

views, . .... 97 Views of Malebrauchc, . . 100

The Encyclopaedists, . . . 101 Materialism consequent upon sen sationalism, .... 101 Results of materialism, . . 101


Intellection the antithesis of sensa tion, 102

Intellection the action of pure mind, 103 The mind generally represented as

possessed of certain faculties, . 103 The more philosophical view of mind, 104 The laws of mind, . . . 105 The principles of mind, . . 105 The voluntary actions of mind, . 106 Imagination, memory, association

of ideas, 106

The moral and emotional part of

our nature a source of ideas, . 106 The idiosyncrasies of mind, . .106 Classification of the mental pheno mena, 106

Memory a property of mind,"as dis tinct from the spontaneous action of mind, from the modifying laws of mind, and from the principles

of mind 107

Memory a property by which the

past is recalled, . . 108 Memory, according to Dr. Brown, 109 In what Dr. Brown's view is defec tive, 109

Memory necessary to every dis crimination of an idea, . .111 This process of memory very rapid, 111 Memory gives identity to our dif ferent states of mind, or allows us to recognise their identity, . 112 This law allows us to recognise the sources of pain, and the causes of danger, and secures the preserva tion of the sentient being, . .112 Memory gathers the larger experi-



unce necessary for the purposes

of intellectual existence, . .113

Proverbs owe their origin to the gathered experience which me mory treasures, . . .114

The scenes which memory por trays, 114

Peculiar characteristic of memory, 115

Memory will survive the grave, . 115

New law of memory in the future world, . . . .115

The surveys of memory in the fu ture world, . . . .116

Imagination blends with the opera tion of memory, . . .116

Memory furnishes many of its ma terials to imagination, . .119

Different kinds of memory : the question answered, whether a great memory and an enlarged or philosophic judgment are com patible? 119

Memory assisted by attention, and that by the interest taken in any given subject, .... 122


By the phenomenon of memory the consciousness of one moment prolonged into the next, . . 123 From this is obtained the feeling

of personal identity, . . 123 Personal identity, . . .123

The precise question, . . .123 The identity of the body, . . 127 The identity of the soul, . .130


Identity as a law of mind,


Resemblance as a law of mind, . 135 Classification proceeds upon this law. . . 136

The law of contrast,


1 low far there must be resemblances and contrasts in objects and quali ties as existing in the universe, 142

The beautiful effect of the law of

contrast 144

Analogy, 147

A species of resemblance, . . 147 The rationale of this law, . . 147 The power of detecting analogies the great scientific, and the great

poetic, faculty 149

Difference between scientific and

poetic analogies, . . . 149 Illustrations derived from analogy, 152 Difference between resemblance and analogy, . . . .155

The law of proportion, . . . 156 Considered under its different as pects, 156

The principles of the mind, . .168

Causality, 169

Generalization, .... 172 Deduction, ..... 191 On the respective natures of induc tion and deduction, . . . 205


Ideas obtained, . . . .214 Review of the process by which

these are obtained, . . .214 Classification of the sciences ac cording to the fundamental and modified ideas, . . . .218


Association of ideas, . . .219 Dr. Brown's secondary laws of as sociation, ..... 225 Remarks upou Dr. Brown's sixth se condary law, that "the influence of the primary laws of suggestion is greatly modified by original constitutional differences," . 230


Classifications of the intellectual phenomena considered, . . 238

The author's view of mind further explicated, .... 244

Controversy as to the nature of ideas, . . . 248




The supposed faculties of mind re solved into the phenomena of sensation and intellection as ex plained in this work, . . 252

Conception, . Abstraction, . Judgment, . Seasoning, . Imagination,


. 252 . 261 . 266 . 269

. 270


The emotional nature generally con sidered, 279

The first essential condition of emo tion, .....


293 294


Illustrated by the views of the


Cheerfulness, .... How cheerfulness is consistent with

the existence of evil, Cheerfulness distinguished from

gaiety, 299

Christian serenity, . . . 300 Cheerfulness distinguished from its

semblances, .... 305 Cheerfulness heightened by kind liness of nature, . . . 306 Opposite emotions to cheerfulness, 310

Melancholy, 313

Fretfulness, Moroseness, Peevish ness, 323

Joy, . . . . . .328

Difference between joy and cheer fulness, 328

The opposite emotion to joy, . 336 How each emotion has its counter part or opposite, . . . 336

Sorrow, 338

The emotions their own end : Final causes connected only with the counterpart emotions, . . 341 The emotions which are excited by events, and those which termin ate on objects, .... 346 Delight, ....... .348

Wonder, 357

Surprise and astonishment, . . 368

Admiration, 372

Wonder and admiration subservi ent to devotion, . . . 379

Wonder becomes worship when God is its object, . . .384

Veneration, Adoration, . . 384

Purposes subserved by the different aspects of wonder, . . . 384

The emotion of the beautiful and the sublime, . . . .388

The emotions which terminate on

being, 390

Love 391

Love in its modified aspects, . 400

Friendship, 412

Patriotism, 413

The antagonism of the emotions

considered, . . . .414 The antagonistic emotions to love, 420

Hatred 421

Anger, resentment, envy, revenge,

indignation, .... 424 Hatred more or less in each of these, 424 These characterized as the malevo lent affections, .... 428 Indignation and resentment distin guished, 428

Relation of anger to indignation

and resentment, . . . 436 Purposes subserved by anger, . 437 Classification of the emotions, . 444 Author's classification more speci fically stated, . . . .448

Sympathy, ... . . 449 Philanthropy, . . . .451 Sympathy with any emotion of an other, 457

Nice effect of the reciprocal influ ence of the emotions, . . 458 b


Our sympathies with the general emotions depend upon constitu tional differences, . . . 460

Sympathy with the aspects of na ture, 461

Generosity, or kindness, and grati tude, 462

Desire, ... . 464

Dr. Eeid's enumeration of the de sires, 464

Stewart's enumeration, . . 464

Dr. Brown's enumeration, . . 464 Desire more properly considered as one of the states of our mental constitution, and any object the object of desire as it yields plea sure, or confers happiness or good, ..... 464 Transition from the emotional to the moral part of our nature, . 467


Peculiarity in the moral nature as distinguished from the phenome nal the practical reason as dis tinguished from the speculative, 473

Facts of the moral nature ultimate, 479

The proper question in regard to the moral nature, or in a theory of morals, .... 482

The confusion that has arisen from the commingling of different ques tions, and treating them as one 483

Right and wrong, . . . 486

A relation appreciable by reason, 489

Yet no reason can be assigned for Tightness or wrongness : the re lation ultimate, . . . 490

The perception of the relation ac companied with an emotion, . 490

The relation not only the object of perception by a percipient agent, but of moral approbation by a moral agent, .... 490

The relation intrinsic, eternal, and not created or constituted, . 491

The law founded on this relation, though eternal and immutable in itself, still in a high sense the law of God, .... 493

Reasons for the promulgation of the law as a command, . . . 497

The law of right is one, . . 500

The law of right as respects the Decalogue, .... 503

The law of right in its different

applications, .... 504 Kant's view of the law of right or

of duty, 507

Error of Kant, .... 509 Distinction drawn by Kant be tween the moral law as a " law of holiness to the Supreme Being," and a " law of duty to every finite intelligent," . . 512 Incorrect idea in respect to duty as obedience to law the foundation of this distinction, . . . 512 Source of Kant's Error, . .514 Moral approbation and disapproba tion, 516

The moral faculty, or conscience, . 524 The power of this principle, . . 528 Its influence upon other states,

mental and emotional, . . 529 The relation of conscience to the other principles of our nature, and to action,- .... 530 The desires as principles of action, 532 The relation of emotion to desire, . 533 The emotions divided into primary

and secondary, .... 534 The philosophy of this question able, 534

The desires secondary to the emo tions, 535

The general sources of the desires, 536 Fear the nearest antagonistic state to desire, 536



Courage ; its aspects, physical and

moral, 536

Hope, a modification of desire, . 537 Hope more peculiarly pertains to a world in which good and evil are

mixed, 541

Dr. Brown's view of desirableness as simply the relation between the object and the desire, . . 542 Indirect refutation of the selfish

system of morals, . . . 543 Unnecessary to dwell upon the par ticular desires, .... 547 Important to notice the aspect the desires now present in connexion with the character they must have exhibited in an unfallen

state 547

The relation of the desires to law, to conscience, and to moral obli gation, ..... 553 The primal state, .... 553 The passions designated noble, . 553 Emulation, ..... 553 Distinction between the desire of excellence and the desire of su periority, ..... 553 Harmony between strictly ethical views and the view of our nature and of duty, or obligation, pre sented in Scripture, . . . 554 Does the love of our neighbour ex ist in our nature as fallen ? . 556 The desire of esteem, wherein jus tifiable, 557

Distinct from the desire of fame or

praise, ..... 558 Shame a modification of this desire, 558 A sinful motive or state often very

near a moral or good one, . . 559 Hence the necessity of watchful ness, 559

The very thoughts and intents of the heart under the inspection of conscience, .... 559 The desires thus cognizable by con science, ..... 559 This leads to the consideration, What part the will has in those

states or actions with which mo ral blame is connected, . . 559 All moral evil deserving of moral

blame, 560

Difficult}-, in the case of the desires, not whether, when evil, they de serve moral blame, but where the blame is due, .... 560 Peculiarity in the case of man's

moral nature, .... 560 Federal representation, . . 560 Inconceivable in the government of God, that where there was no guilt in any sense, any being could be involved in the evil to which guilt attaches, . . 561 Evil desire guilty. More directly culpable, if entertained or accom panied by an act of will, . .561 The relation of will to an act to be

considered, .... 561 The nature of the will, . . 561 The connexion of the will with our active principles, with action, and with the right and wrong of an

action, 564

The state of the desires, . . 566 The desires, considered as regards their objects, or the sources from which they spring, either moral, aesthetic, or physical the last including the appetites, . . 572 The physical nature not so much the region of emotion as of feel ing, and that feeling not so much mental as bodily the desires belonging to the body, therefore, appetites rather than desires, . 573 Bodily desires which are not ap petites, ..... 573 The moral desires, . . . 573 Benevolent and malevolent desires, 575 Virtuous and vicious desires, . 575 The aesthetic desires, . . . 576 The physical desires, . . . 577 The relation of the will to action, and the question of the freedom of the will, . . . .578 I The relation between judgment,



motive, and desire, causal, or that between cause and effect, . .579 Is it the same relation between

these and will ? . . .581 Activity of the will, . . . 582 The phenomenon of the activity of tJie will amid motive influence, seen in other departments besides that of the will causal influence and yet independent action, . 588 Relation of the will to morality, . 597 To morality in the emotions, or internal states, as well as in the actions, 597

Dr. Chalmers's view on this sub ject, 606

How did the emotions become guilty? Or, the source of evil motive, and an evil will, . . 609

On the origin of evil, . . .610

Different opinions entertained on this subject, . . . .610

The Manichean doctrine, . .611

Evil regarded as a defect, not posi tive, 612

How far our minds can go in de termining the origin of evil, . 612

Practical conclusion, . . . 613


THE precise nature and objects of Metaphysical Science have been much misapprehended, and the science itself in conse quence has suffered even in the estimation of those whose favour it is most important to propitiate. Metaphysics with some is another name for whatever is shadowy, impalpable, obscure. It has been thought that nothing satisfactory can be determined, and no valuable results arrived at. Some have regarded the metaphysics of one age as chiefly useful in cor recting those of another. They ought to be studied, according to this view, that we may guard against the mistakes that philosophers have fallen into, or that we may be able to refute their errors. With others it is only as an exercise of intellect, and for the quickening of our faculties, that the science is useful. It is in this latter view that Lord Jeffrey regards the science as chiefly valuable. He would recommend it for no other purpose, and he sees no other good that can result from it. Carlyle has the following quarrel with all philosophy : " The mere existence and necessity of a philosophy," says he, " is an evil. Man is sent hither not to question, but to work : ' the end of man/ it was long ago written, ' is an action, not a thought/ In the perfect state, all thought were but the picture and inspiring symbol of action ; philosophy, except as poetry and religion, had no being. And yet, how in this im perfect state," this writer adds, " can it be avoided, can it be dispensed with ? Man stands as in the centre of nature ; his



fraction of time encircled by eternity, his handbreadth of space encircled by infinitude : how shall he forbear asking himself, what am I ; and whence ; and whither ? How, too, except in slight partial hints, in kind asseverations and assurances, such as a mother quiets her fretful inquisitive child with, shall he get answer to such inquiries ?" Goethe, in speaking of the work, " Systeme de la Nature," which he and some friends had read with great disappointment, and whose barren and sceptical speculations he condemns, says, " If, after all, this book did us any mischief, it was this that we took a hearty dislike to all philosophy, and especially metaphysics, and re mained in that dislike ; while, on the other hand, we threw ourselves into living knowledge, experience, action, and poetiz ing, with all the more liveliness and passion."

All these views proceed upon the mistake that the mind cannot be a proper subject of study ; for if it can, we see no harm in studying its laws and phenomena, as well as those of any other subject of investigation. Is mind alone of all sub jects the only one that will not submit to our investigation or scrutiny, or that will yield no return to our efforts to analyze or comprehend it ? It is obviously taken for granted that mind escapes our observation, or will not submit to our analysis. It is as if it were some impalpable essence that evaporated as soon as we endeavoured to apply to it our chemical tests, or brought to bear upon it our mental analysis. Has mind no laws by which it is regulated ? Does it exhibit no settled facts which may be made the subject of observation ? Have we no con sciousness by which the facts of mind may be marked and recorded ? Must error so unavoidably be fallen into in regard to the phenomena of mind, that every successive age must be employed only in correcting the errors of the preceding ? Is mind not a real existence as much as matter ; and are its laws and phenomena not as worthy of being ascertained as those of the external universe ? Must it only be as a mental discipline that we should study that internal substance, which, if it is invisible, is yet the principle by which we think, which indeed truly constitutes ourselves, and which subjects everything


else to its observation ? It is the thinking Being to which all thought is amenable, to which thought owes its own being or existence. Must we think about everything but ourselves ? We have somewhere seen it said by Carlyle in his own peculiar way that he would rather think, than think about thinking. There is point here, and there is some degree of satire. There was a sardonic smile, no doubt, upon the countenance of the writer or speaker as he uttered these words. But in all gravity and seriousness, is it not interesting to think about mind, the processes through which it passes, from darkness to day, from its first dawn of intelligence to its maturest thought and dis covery ? But there is more than what is merely interesting. The laws of mind underlie all philosophy, and it is its forma tive processes that put its laws even upon matter. A few original ideas are the roots of all science. Whewell shews this, and he founds his classification of the sciences upon these few ideas. It is true that the sciences are independent of the knowledge of this : but it is important to see the relation that our ideas bear to the actual phenomena of the outer world ; and he is the most intelligent philosopher who can determine what part mind has, and what part matter, or the phenomenal world, in the observed laws and processes of nature. Car lyle has regarded metaphysics as a science of doubt rather than a science of positive knowledge ; and in one sense it is so. Doubt, not unbelief ignorance, not scepticism. A science of doubt a science of ignorance might well seem a contradic tion. But the doubt is the doubt forced upon us by the neces sary limitation to our faculties the ignorance is the ignorance necessitated by the limits set to our knowledge by the Creator. In another state of being these limits may be removed or greatly extended, and we may penetrate into the essence of things, we may discern the nature of Being Being and not merely phenomena may be unfolded: ontology— not mere psychology may be possible. Here it is different, and the limits to our knowledge it is important to ascertain. The surrounding ignorance, or enveloping mystery, that wraps the universe, it is as important to know, perhaps, as what may be


ascertained or known in the character of phenomena. With the latter we may be practical philosophers, and able to adapt phenomena to their uses, and there may be no limit to the successive development of the laws of matter, and to the appli cations of these laws ; but for the higher state of man, whether is it more important to know these laws and all their possible applications, or to know the ignorance which invests them, or the limits which bounds our knowledge of them ? Our know ledge of those limits first took the shape of scepticism ; it arose in that phantom form : philosophy was a shadow point ing to vacancy : everything was phenomenal : matter was denied : time and space were annihilated : power was but a sequence ; and in Germany, and with many even in our own country, this is still the form which philosophy assumes : it is a negation of all being, save perhaps our own being, and that of God. Or if among German philosophers anything redeems philosophy from this character, it is the prominence that is allowed to the phenomenal, making it almost as good as the actual, denying at one moment the actual, and restoring it the next, under terms which do not assert its existence, but still imply something more than mere appearances or phenomena. The right state of mind, and that for which true philosophy is valuable, is not scepticism as to the Actual, but suspended inquiry as to what the Actual is diffidence and mystery : surely the most appropriate states of mind for the creature, everywhere in the vestibule of that divine temple whose worship is mystery united with intelligence, where God sits enshrined in the inner sanctuary, or only withdrawn behind that veil which envelops all his works. Hence we find Carlyle himself writing : " Much as we have said and mourned about the unproductive prevalence of metaphysics, it was not without some insight into the use which lies in them. Metaphysical speculation, if a necessary evil, is the forerunner of much good. The fever of scepticism must needs burn itself out, and burn out thereby the impurities that caused it ; then again will there be clearness, health. The principle of life which now struggles painfully, in the outer, thin, and barren domain of


the conscious or mechanical, may then withdraw into its inner sanctuaries, its abysses of mystery and miracle, withdraw deeper than ever into that domain of the unconscious, by nature infinite and inexhaustible ; and creatively work there." The unconscious here, with Carlyle, as distinguished from what we suppose must be called the conscious, is where the mind is beyond the region of mere questioning or inquiry, and creates, works unconsciously, and brings up thought from the deeps of its own nature. " From that mystic region," says Carlyle, " and from that alone, all wonders, all poesies, and religions, and social systems, have proceeded : the like wonders, and greater and higher, lie slumbering there ; and brooded over by the spirit of the waters, will evolve themselves, and rise like exhalations from the deep." Will the mind ever arrive at that state described by Carlyle ? Will it ever be entirely creative ? Is not this the prerogative of the self-existent and infinite mind alone ? Shall we ever cease to inquire into the phenomenal, or cease to wonder at the absolute ?* It is metaphysics at all events that carries us to the absolute, and it is undoubtedly a higher position for the mind to occupy than the investigation of the phenomenal simply. Carlyle withdraws his own depre ciatory estimate ; and there could not be a higher praise of metaphysics than what he has accorded to it. It is the grand purpose of metaphysics to bring us to the absolute, and to suspend our inquiries there. It investigates the phenomenal for the sake of the absolute, or to determine the phenomenal, and see what is beyond, or look into the " abysses of mystery and miracle." That is the high, purpose of metaphysics, and that is the service which she performs. There is not a more important and higher function of the mind than that of won der, and we never wonder at the phenomenal merely : it is what is beyond, what is in, the phenomenon its nature, the law at work, or the power that created it, or that operates in it. it is this that excites our wonder ; and whenever we pass

* We oppose the Absolute to the they are to be distinguished seems hard- Phenomenal, and we leave our readers 1 y to admit of a doubt, to determine the nature of each : that


from the phenomenal, or suspend our minds in wonder at the law present in it, we are in the domain of a higher philosophy than the mechanical or the simply physical. In the region of mystery and wonder we strive to reach the mind of God : we try to enter into the arcana of his nature to see his secret counsels, or the very law of his intelligence ; and failing to do this, we adore, we reverence, we admire and praise. We stand outside, when we cannot enter the inner shrine.

But metaphysics has to do with the phenomenal as well as what is beyond it, or in it. It not only leads us to the unknown, to the actual, and suspends our minds in wonder before it, but it investigates what may be known : it interro gates mind as to its phenomena, and takes the information which mind yields to its own inquiries. Mind may be as much the subject of observation as matter, not the observation of the senses indeed, but of as sure and competent a power, or witness, as the senses. There is not a process that goes on in the mind but is known to the mind itself intimates its existence, or reveals its nature. Its very existence is the mind's intelligence of it. It intimates itself by its own presence. We call this consciousness : the mind is conscious of its own states, or, as we may say, self-conscious. Then there is the power of memory by which a past state may be recalled, and may be present by a kind of second consciousness ; or the memory of the state is the exact counterpart of the state itself, and this also is the subject of consciousness, or, again, is the mind's intelligence of it. It is said now to be the subject of reflection ; or this repeated consciousness continues as long as we please, and we are thus said to reflect upon it. Or reflection is the turning of the thought of the mind upon its own states, whether present or repeated : there is not only the state intimating itself self- revealing, if we may so speak but there is the turning of the mind in upon the state : there is something like a mental observation ; and this may be as sure a source of information as the observation of the senses in regard to external pheno mena, or the outward world. The mind is self-cognizant. Its own arcana are open to its own inspection. It can minutely


observe its most intimate and secret workings : it can mark and record every thought, or feeling, or observation. It can see the exact state what it is what it amounts to. Now, is not the mind as worthy of observation as the external world ? Are not its phenomena as wonderful, and as legitimately a subject of speculation or investigation as those of matter ? The differ ence seems to be, that the phenomena of mind being so much a part of ourselves, and so much the subject of self-consciousness, it is taken for granted that we know them already, and know them sufficiently, while we can know nothing of matter unless we investigate it, and matter seems therefore more legitimately the object of our observation, the proper subject of study. Then, the laws of matter cannot be applied unless we investi gate them and know them ; but we apply the laws of mind whether we have investigated them or not. They operate spontaneously within in spite of ourselves, and all our know ledge of them hardly improves their own spontaneous action. But is knowledge to be valued by its practical utility ? Is knowledge not valuable on its own account ? and shall we shut ourselves out from all knowledge unless it can render a practical return, or lead to some practical consequences ? Then, indeed, our physical philosophers, our economists, our statesmen, our observers of nature, are our only true philoso phers, and their science alone is valuable. And this is the estimate accordingly which the world is disposed to form. Macaulay draws a contrast between the practical philosophy of Bacon and its mighty results, and the philosophy of the specu lative minds of Greece, however vast their powers, and sublime and admirable in many respects their speculations. But even tried in this way, surely moral speculation, and disquisitions upon mind, will not yield in importance to that philosophy which promises to reduce matter to the power of man, and make us indeed Lords of creation. What although we were although we could wield the thunder as we can direct its electric element although the sea were as obedient to us as a child although we could apply every law of nature to our use ? there is in a single moral thought what is intrinsically


more valuable than all nature together, with all its laws and phenomena ; and the immense physical advantages resulting from the sciences may be purchased too dearly, if the science of our mental and moral constitution is neglected or uncul tivated. Man may be too mechanical : he may pursue his physical objects too exclusively : he may have these too exclu sively before him ; and some attention to the being within him not within him, but actually himself might be of use in impressing a higher character, in imparting a loftier tone to his nature, and making him not the mere man of the world, or of matter, but a spiritual being capable of holding converse with other spiritual beings, and moving through the world not as if he were to be a denizen of it for ever, but as having a destiny above it, and that will not be limited by its duration.

The mind surely deserves to be known, and its phenomena are worthy of being observed or studied. And indeed they are so, while this may not be very formally the case. We are all more or less observers of the phenomena within us : we all take note, more or less, of what passes in our mental frames or con stitutions. It is not necessary for the mind to be formally studied in order to our being metaphysicians. We are meta physicians in spite of ourselves : we are philosophers whether we know it or not. Shall we complete our accomplishments in this way, or shall we be contented with imperfect conclusions, with half-formed speculations ? Shall we be superficial in our knowledge, or shall we inquire deeper ? Shall we observe more closely our mental phenomena ? Shall we make our own mind the subject of study ? An enlightened curiosity would surely lead us to do so. An enlightened wisdom tells us that

" The proper study of mankind is man ;"

and man's spiritual nature is what truly, as we have said, con stitutes himself. A certain knowledge of this ramifies itself through all other knowledge, except such as is strictly physical. We are perpetually applying laws of our spiritual being, of our mental arid moral constitution, to subjects and questions that may be but of very subordinate moment. Their application in


literature is constant and direct. Does not history draw upon the knowledge of them in its delineations of character, and its statement of the principles of action and modes of life ? Bio graphy cannot do without this knowledge. To the orator it is essential who would sway the minds of others, direct their counsels, or influence their persuasions. The politician, the